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I. THE QUEST FOR A CONCEPT
Privacy is an old and venerable subject.1 Generations of lawyers,
judges, and legal scholars have explored its different aspects. The num-
ber of cases is countless, the list of statutes long and impressive.2 Yet,
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1 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (identifying zones of
individual privacy guaranteed by the United States Constitution); Millar v. Taylor, 98
Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (K.B. 1769) ("It is certain every man has a right to keep his own
sentiments, if he pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them
public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends."); B. MOORE, PRIVACY: STUD-
IES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY (1984) (examining the concepts of public and
private in various societies including 4th century B.C. Athens, ancient Hebrew society
as reflected in the Old Testament, and ancient China at the age of the "hundred philos-
ophers," 551 B.C. to 233 B.C.). See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Pri-
vacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (tracing the development of protection for the indi-
vidual's person and property and advocating recognition of the right to privacy and of
remedies for its violation).
, In American law, recent discussion of the individual's right to privacy has arisen
in cases involving sexual and reproductive matters, see, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106
S. Ct. 2841 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and in cases concerning collec-
tion or disclosure of information, see, e.g., Department of State v. Washington Post
Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976);
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). Other cases have involved
the individual's right as to personal appearance, Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976), as well as the right of privacy with regard to publicity upon arrest, Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), with both cases illustrating the tendency to restrict privacy
to family, sexual, and reproductive matters. As to the individual's right of privacy in
the context of criminal investigation, "[clases are legion that condemn violent searches
and invasions of an individual's right to the privacy of his dwelling." Miller, 425 U.S.
at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238,
247, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1974)).
As to statutes, see, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982),
amended by 4 U.S.C. § 402(2) (Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1986); Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982), amended by 1 U.S.C. § 107(9) (Supp. III 1985 & West
Supp. 1986); Privacy Act, B.C. Stat. ch. 39 (1968) (British Columbia); CODE CIVIL [C.
Civ.] art. 9 (Fr.); Loi relative a l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libert&s, Loi No. 78-
17 of 6 January 1978, 1978 Journal Officiel de la Rfpublique Francaise [J.O.1 227,
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"privacy research" was recently described as being in "hopeless disar-
ray"' and the whole debate characterized as "ultimately, futile."4 In-
deed, the more the need for a convincing definition of privacy based on
criteria free of inconsistencies has been stressed, the more abstract the
language has grown.
Rather than looking to the specific societal, political, and economic
factors triggering the controversy, commentators (and courts) have con-
stantly invoked notions of rights, natural or otherwise,' "fundamental
values,"' or "human dignity" to determine the meaning and extent of
the right of privacy. Even where an apparently far more earthy ap-
proach, such as economic analysis, is chosen,8 the degree of abstraction
1978 Bulletin l~gislatif Dalloz [B.L.D.] 77 (Fr.) (French data protection law); SCHWE-
IZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] art. 28 (Switz.); Gesetz zum Schutz vor Missb-
rauch personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbeitung (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz),
Jan. 27, 1977, 1977 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 201 [hereinafter BDSG] (West Ger-
man data protection law); see also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY (1972)
(Younger Committee) (U.K).
I See Parent, Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 341, 341
(1983).
' See Wacks, The Poverty of "Privacy," 96 L.Q. REv. 73, 76-77 (1980).
See, e.g., Negley, Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 319-20 (1966) (asserting that past efforts of moralists to estab-
lish a value judgment on the moral options of the individual led them to discuss privacy
as a "natural right," a view rejected by modern thinkers).
' See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977) (stating
that the sanctity of the family is protected because it is a basic value, a part of the
nation's history and traditions); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (stating
that the right of privacy found to exist under the Constitution includes fundamental
personal rights relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education).
7 See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. 2, 1957, 24 Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen
[BGHZ] 76 (W. Ger.) (referring to both human dignity and the constitutional right for
free development of the individual's personality as the origin of the privacy right);
Schacht case, 13 BGHZ 334 (1954) (invoking the constitutional right of respect for
human dignity as basis of the privacy right); P. PERLINGIERI, LA PERSONALITA
UMANA NELL'ORDINAMENTO GIURIDICO 14 (1972) (The Italian constitution, recogniz-
ing that the individual can only develop as a part of the community, places respect for
individual human dignity on a par with the life of the community, not subordinate to
it.); Bloustein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle, 8 Rtrr.-CAM. L.J. 219, 278
(1977) ("The right to be let alone protects the integrity and the dignity of the individ-
ual."); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Pros-
ser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1000-07 (1964) (arguing that "all of the tort privacy cases
involve the same interest in preserving human dignity and individuality").
8 See, e.g., Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393 (1978) (suggesting
that privacy and prying are intermediate economic goods used only to acquire other
final goods or utility); Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12
GA. L. REV. 455 (1978) (a response to Posner, arguing that Posner's conclusions about
privacy based on economic analysis could be more firmly grounded in traditional tort
theories, although admitting that privacy is a value that cannot be obtained "solely as of
legal right"); Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1979)
(1978 James McCormick Mitchell lecture) (continuing the economic analysis of pri-
vacy and extending it to address seclusion of the individual, defamation, and the role of
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remains considerable. Consequently, the boundary between a permissi-
ble exchange of facts about people, necessary to avoid misrepresenta-
tion, and an impermissible intrusion and surveillance is entirely un-
clear.9 Whether, for example, credit reports, medical records, personnel
information systems, social security data bases, police files, or sub-
scriber profiles established in connection with interactive cable televi-
sion services are legitimate sources of information cannot be decided by
simply pointing to the impact of misrepresentation on economic effi-
ciency and hence at the corrective function of prying. The answer de-
pends essentially on the particular purposes of each data collection as
well as on the mode of the information process and the potential impli-
cations of the data use for the persons under scrutiny.
The increased access to personal information resulting from mod-
ern, sophisticated techniques of automated processing has sharpened the
need to abandon the search for a "neutral" concept 0 in favor of an
understanding free of abstractions and fully aware of the political and
societal background of all privacy debates.1 Modern forms of data col-
lection have altered the privacy discussion in three principal ways.
First, privacy considerations no longer arise out of particular individual
problems; rather, they express conflicts affecting everyone. The course
of the privacy debate is neither determined by the caricature of a prom-
inent golfer with a chocolate packet protruding out of his pocket,1 2 nor
by the hints at the use of a sexual stimulant by a respected university
government as invader of the privacy of its citizens).
9 See Posner, The Right of Privacy, supra note 8, at 394-406.
10 See Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423, 425-28
(1980) (arguing for a neutral concept of privacy that would facilitate both clear identi-
fication of losses of privacy and intelligible discussions of privacy and claims thereto).
" For a critical approach, see S. RODOTA, ELABORATORI ELETTRONICI E CON-
TROLLO SOCIALE 27-33, 125-32 (1973) (presenting a history of the privacy right and
discussing both unitary and multifaceted conceptualizations of privacy); J. RuLE, D.
McADAM, L. STEARNS & D. UGLOW, THE PoLrrIcs OF PRIVACY 21-24 (1980) (sug-
gesting a global definition of privacy as "the restriction of others' access to information
about oneself" to encompass both aesthetic privacy, restriction of personal information
as an end in itself, and strategic privacy, restriction of such information as a means to
some other end); Rodota, Verletzlichkeit des Individuums und der GeselIschaft, in
1984 UND DANACH: DIE GESELLSCHAFTLICHE HERAUSFORDERUNG DER INFORMA-
TIONSTECHNIK 194, 199-204 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 UND DANACH] (Internationale
Konferenz der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und des Senats von Berlin
in Zusammenarbeit mit der Organisation fUr wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und
Entwicklung, Berlin, Nov. 28-30, 1984) (favoring a data protection policy based not
only on statutory regulation but also on private rules created by the industries con-
cerned, e.g., the Warner Code of Privacy).
12 See Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd., 100 L.J.K.B. 328 (1931). In this action for
libel, the plaintiff, an amateur golfer, objected to the defendant's use of his (plaintiff's)
picture in an advertisement for the defendant's chocolate candy. The plaintiff claimed
that the advertisement "prostituted his reputation" and invaded his privacy.
1987]
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professor,18 but by the intensive retrieval of personal data of virtually
every employee, taxpayer, patient, bank customer, welfare recipient, or
car driver. Second, smart cards 4 and videotex 15 make it possible to rec-
ord and reconstruct individual activities in minute detail. Surveillance
has thereby lost its exceptional character and has become a more and
more routine practice. Finally, personal information is increasingly
used to enforce standards of behavior. Information processing is devel-
oping, therefore, into an essential element of long-term strategies of
manipulation intended to mold and adjust individual conduct. All three
aspects are illustrated by a wide range of experiences.
II. EXAMPLES OF INFORMATION GATHERING
A. The Transparent Patient
Medical expenses in most countries have risen sharply in recent
years."' No medical care system, whatever its organizational structure,
can ignore these exploding costs without endangering its own existence.
Both government agencies and the health care industry, therefore, have
concentrated their efforts on developing and implementing cost-saving
policies.17 The result is a growing interest in the individual patient's
behavior. Because the patient triggers the cost chain, her behavior in-
fluences, to a decisive extent, the expenditure.
All insurance reimbursements presuppose a minimum of personal
information about the insured in the hands of the insurer. Some infor-
mation has already been collected at the establishment of the insurance
relationship. The more comprehensive the coverage, the more detailed
the information stored. In addition, the record is supplemented by the
information provided in connection with every new claim. Yet, what at
first seems to have no other purpose than to permit the due fulfillment
13 See Ginseng case, 35 BGHZ 363 (1961) (holding that mention of a law profes-
sor's name in an advertisement for sexual stimulants constitutes a serious and compen-
sable violation of the privacy right).
14 "Smart" or "intelligent" cards are microprocessors within credit cards. The
most familiar example is an automated banking card. For a description of smart cards,
see Weingarten, Information Technology and Privacy Trends in Products and Ser-
vices, in INVITED PAPERS ON PRIVACY: LAW, ETmICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 15, 17-18
(1982) (National Symposium on Personal Privacy and Information Technology, Oct. 4-
7, 1981).
15 Videotex is a broad term that embraces several kinds of video technologies. See
id. at 19-21; infra text accompanying notes 93-98.
IS See, e.g., U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Health Insurance: Coverage and Em-
ployment Opportunities for Minorites and Women 1 (1982); Comment, Containment
of Hospital and Health Care Costs-The Regulated Marketplace, 13 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 795 (1985).
17 See Comment, supra note 16, at 796-97.
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of an existing commitment may be transformed into valuable material
for review of the insurer's policies. The insurer may use the data to
identify both the sources of additional expenses and patients that are
particularly costly. Modern technology facilitates such identification be-
cause computers can store a virtually unlimited amount of data and
permit endless variation in the kinds of retrievals performed. The rea-
sons for which the information was originally collected become irrele-
vant. Once the data have been stored, insurers can use the information
for a variety of purposes unconnected with the initial purpose of the
data collection.
In West Germany, for instance, medical cost data were scanned
systematically to detect the main cost-raising factors and to outline the
profile of the ideal cost-saving patient.1 8 The findings led to a series of
corrective measures directly affecting the patients. For example, the so-
cial security agencies developed a new form that must be presented to
the doctor at the beginning of each consultation. The form explicitly
requires that the doctor confine her services to "strictly necessary"
treatments and enumerates therapeutic measures as well as certain
medication that cannot be prescribed without prior approval of the
agency.19
Some private insurers have also matched the computer-calculated
cost optimum against patient data in order to determine which patients
had proven more costly than this optimum and under what circum-
stances. Deviations from the optimum were then brought to the pa-
tient's attention in personal letters that also asked them to discuss, with
a doctor named by the insurance company, ways and means of reducing
future costs. None of these programs was developed in order to identify
fraudulent claims. The sole aim of such programs was to measure the
behavior of all the insurance beneficiaries against the computer-
designed model behavior.2"
Another equally significant example is "G~iatrix," an informa-
tion system developed in France to determine the degree of "autonomy"
of the elderly institutionalized in nursing homes and hospitals.21 An
individual's degree of autonomy is established by using data provided
11 See 12 TXTIGKEITSBERICHT DES HESSISCHEN DATENSCHUTZBEAUFTRAGTEN
73-82 (1983) [hereinafter TB HDSB].
19 See id. at 73-74.
20 See id. at 78-82.
21 The system was reported to the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des
Libert~s ("CNIL"). See CNIL, Rapport sur une demande d'avis pr~sente par les
tablissements hospitaliers de Bischwiller et relative A un traitement automatis6 d&
nomm6 "G6riatrix" dont la finalit6 principale est 1'6valuation d'une 6chelle
d'autonomie des personnes ig~es 2 (Sept. 12, 1985).
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by the personnel at the nursing home or hospital; the data are then
evaluated by computer according to twenty-seven criteria that relate to,
among other factors, the patient's mobility, sensory and mental capac-
ity, and physical as well as intellectual activities. The result is inte-
grated into a rough visual sketch of a person (the "gronte") showing
the relevant autonomy zones and indicating by three different colors the
actual state of the patient, so that the degree of autonomy can be
judged, roughly, at a glance. 2 Hospitals and nursing homes consider
this continually updated, individualized information to be an important
tool in reducing their personnel costs because it enables them to estab-
lish care needs better and to allocate various tasks among their person-
nel. At the same time, the sketch aids them in lowering their total ex-
penditures by helping them calculate more precisely the necessary
expenses for each institutionalized person.23 Such a system is not with-
out danger to the individual patient's privacy. As the government report
to the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libert~s recog-
nized, there is the risk that such a system becomes the sole evaluative
factor, rather than one element to be used in the patient's prognosis.24
There are also dangers to the confidentiality of the information and to
its use without the knowledge of the patient or the patient's family.
25
Automated processing thus serves control as well as planning func-
tions. It guarantees transparency and maximizes flexibility. Insurers
can not only detect deviant behavior but also can more effectively tailor
cost-saving programs to the needs and demands of the insured, the doc-
tors, the hospitals, and the pharmaceutical industry. The other side of
the coin is, however, no less obvious: such data use results in an en-
tirely transparent patient who becomes the object of a policy that delib-
erately employs all available information on her habits and activities in
order to adapt her to insurers' expectations.26 The patient is seen and
treated as the sum of constantly increasing, strictly formalized, and
carefully recorded data that can, at any moment, be combined and com-
pared according to criteria fixed by insurers. Hence, as automated
processing is perfected, the patient's position is increasingly determined
by a computer-made and insurer-approved, secondhand identity.
2 See id.
2 See id. at 4.
- See id. at 5.
25 See id. at 6-7.
26 See 12 TB HDSB 77; 13 TB HDSB 86 (1984).
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B. The Righteous Citizen
1. Prevention of Anti-Social Activity by Children
In 1982, a research project designed by the Health Council of Oslo
was submitted for approval to the Norwegian Data Inspectorate. 2 7 Its
purpose was to identify behavioral patterns of small children that might
indicate psychological problems or later lead to "anti-social" activi-
ties.28 In order to obtain the necessary information, police files were to
be scanned for children who had exhibited delinquent behavior. Au-
thorities next would examine the school and health authorities' records
of these same children and would use this information to identify "typi-
cal danger signals." They then would perform a second, far more de-
tailed search of the school and health authorities' records to establish a
list of all children satisfying these criteria. Finally, a special assistance
program would be developed to aid the risk group identified by this
search.29
Although this kind of study may at first appear to be an exception
rather than the rule, it is by no means unusual. In 1973, the informa-
tion system "Gamin," covering sixty percent of the children in thirty-
four French d6partements went into effect.30 The system collected data
provided mainly by a series of medical examinations; its goal, like that
of the Norwegian program, was the reduction of social and medical
risks."1 Hence, risk profiles were outlined on the basis of nearly 170
factors and then used as search criteria to identify other cfiildren need-
ing preventive social and medical surveillance.3 2 A similar example is
the recent attempt by the city of Bremen, West Germany, to establish
an automated file of children exhibiting obviously "odd behavior."
Thefts, excessive aggressiveness, or repeated lying were the identifying
signs. Once again, the aim was therapeutic: to treat and to inhibit
"dangerous" behavior and thus to guide the child to adapt better to
societal expectations.33
27 See Bing, Data Protection and Social Policy, in BEYOND 1984: THE LAW AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN TOMORROW'S SOCIETY 82, 91 (Council of Europe
1985) [hereinafter BEYOND 1984] (Proceedings of the 14th Colloquy on European
Law, Lisbon, Sept. 26-28, 1984).
28 See id.
29 See id.
SO See CNIL, 2kME RAPPORT D'AcTIVITIE, 1ER OCTOBRE 1980 - 15 OCTOBRE
1981, at 28-29 (1982) [hereinafter CNIL, 2iME RAPPORT].
S" See id. at 29.
31 See id. at 30; see also CNIL, BILAN ET PERSPECrIVES 1978-1980, at 84
(1980). In June, 1981 the ONIL rendered an unfavorable opinion on the program. See
ONIL, 2PME RAPPORT, supra note 30, at 28.
" See BREMISCHE BORGERSCHAFT LANDTAG, 7 JAHRESBERICHT DES
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In all three cases discussed above, automated processing .is re-
garded as an aid to prevent deviations from socially acceptable behav-
ioral patterns. The righteous citizen is both the incentive and the goal
of the retrieval. It is therefore not surprising that the attention focuses
on children: they are the ideal object of a preventive policy. Society has,
it seems, the chance to intervene before the risk becomes so great as to
necessitate repressive correction. In these instances, automated process-
ing is used to render individual behavior as transparent and under-
standable as possible in order to develop a series of measures anticipat-
ing reactions and adjusting them to a predetermined model. The
computer matches the existing files, retrieves the necessary data, and
restructures these data for purposes entirely different from the original
collection aims.
2. Control of Adult Behavior
While prevention of anti-social behavior prevails in the case of
:_hildren, behavioral control constitutes an equally strong goal when the
attention focuses on adults. Social security again presents a good exam-
ple. The gradual expansion of social assistance systems to include vari-
ous educational programs, professional aids, and protective services has
been one of the outstanding features of state activity in the past years.
In fact, a continuously growing welfare administration is probably the
most characteristic feature of an activist welfare state.3 4 As long as so-
cial policies were designed and implemented against the background of
a prosperous or at least stable economy, only the administrative details
of implementation seemed to matter. As economic conditions have
changed, however, governments have adopted clearly restrictive atti-
tudes. One result has been cutbacks in financial assistance, accompa-
nied by increasingly sharpened attempts to control the behavior of the
LANDESBEAUFTRAGTEN FOR DEN DATENSCHUTZ 56-58 (1985) (Drucksache 11/365).
11 See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984) (discuss-
ing the activist American legal culture since the New Deal); M. DAMASKA, THE
FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE
LEGAL PROCESS 80 (1986) (stating as a general characteristic of the activist state the
development of programs encompassing all aspects of life); DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE
WELFARE STATE (G. Teubner ed. 1986); F. SCHARPF, PLANUNG ALS POLITISCHER
PRozEss: AUFSXTZE ZUR THEORIE DER PLANENDEN DEMOKRATIE 114 (1973) (dis-
cussing the growing complexity of the administrative system); R. TITMUSs, ESSAYS ON
"THE WELFARE STATE" (1958); Simitis, The Juridification of Labor Relations, 7
COMP. LAB. L. 93, 100 (1986) (discussing effect of social legislation on scope and
conditions of state intervention in labor relations). See generally Ackerman, Foreward:
The Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083 (1983) (arguing that the develop-
ment of the activist state since the New Deal has fundamentally transformed legal
discourse).
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social programs' beneficiaries.
In the United States, the social security number ("SSN") has be-
come the master key to all information considered necessary for control
purposes. Most of the nearly 500 computer matching programs carried
out at the federal and state levels depend on the SSN.3 5 For example,
section 2651 of the 1984 U.S. Deficit Reduction Act"6 requires that
applicants for all programs of the federal Social Security Administra-
tion supply their social security number. The reason is obvious: the
number provides a reliable and timely means for identification of ineli-
gible persons and incorrect payments.37 The SSN permits the correla-
tion of data held by different agencies and transforms government into
a permanently accessible information unit. More importantly, the SSN
bridges the gap between the public and the private sector. For instance,
computer matches of the SSN conducted on recipients of federal Aid to
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") used data from state in-
come tax, motor vehicle registration, school records, correction files on
inmate status, veteran records, worker's compensation, and low income
home compilations together with bureau records from employers,
banks, and credit agencies. 8
Once the emphasis is placed on control, neither the sensitivity of
the data nor the existence of access barriers, otherwise considered in-
surmountable, comes into play. The Inspector General's Office for the
" For a discussion of both the matching practices in the social security field and
the key function of the SSN, see D. BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE
182-83 (1983) (discussing the Social Security Administration's plan to examine IRS
records to determine whether those receiving supplemental benefits had received divi-
dend and interest payments); PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRI-
VACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 605-18 (1977); Langan, Computer Matching Pro-
grams: A Threat to Privacy?, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 143, 169-71 (1979).
31 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2651, 98 Stat. 494, 1147
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1986)).
17 HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 757, 1410-12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1445, 2098-2100.
38 CONTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS: ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION
AND PRIVACY IN FEDERAL BENEFIT PROGRAMS: A DELICATE BALANCE 5-18, 22-32
(GAO/HRD-85-22, Mar. 1, 1985)); see also Oversight of Computer Matching to De-
tect Fraud and Mismanagement in Government Programs, 1982: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 222-50 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Senate Hear-
ings] (testimony of William T. Hogan, Jr., Secretary, Massachusetts Executive Office
of Human Services) (discussing data matches, with particular reference to use of bank
asset data, on Massachusetts recipients of AFDC and other welfare benefits).
Since September 1986, the duty to conduct regular matches has shifted to the
states. In order to receive federal funds they must operate a State Income Eligibility
Verification System ("SIEVS") that permits continuous control of the recipients. See
"SIEVS" Creating Headaches in the States, 12 PRIVACY J. 6 (June 1986).
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United States Department of Health and Human Services, for instance,
did not hesitate to design computer programs that identify "illogical
billing situations" in the case of abortions and sterilizations.3 9 The atti-
tude of the West German authorities is no less significant. The range of
the "social security secret" established by law and explicitly excluding a
free flow of social security data has been restricted: use of such infor-
mation is permitted for purposes as different as pursuing moonlighters,
controlling the work permits of foreigners, or uncovering fraudulent ac-
tivities in general. 40 In addition, some of the West German social secur-
ity agencies have begun to compile a list of characteristics of potential
"assistance-chiselers" and to distribute "warning lists" to the other
branches of government, as well as to private institutions such as the
Salvation Army.
41
Similar tendencies have been observed in the taxation field. A gov-
ernment's financial resources depend to a decisive extent on punctual
and correct tax payments by citizens. Governments will be tempted to
use all available information to secure payment, particularly in eco-
nomically critical situations. Automated processing again serves as a
most welcome tool. For example, the United States Internal Revenue
Service tries to identify underpayers or evaders of federal taxes by
matching its own data against state, municipal, and private business
records.42 Its regional office in Texas has sought to establish electronic
links with eighty counties and thereby gain instant access to local tax,
voter registration, and automobile ownership files.43
Other countries also have viewed identification systems as a solu-
tion to information problems in dealing with their citizens. In a White
Paper published in 1985, the Australian Federal Government advo-
sB See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 1
COMPUTER APPLICATIONS, in 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 287, 334-35.
40 See Simitis, Reicht unser Datenschutzrecht angesichts der technischen Revolu-
tion?-Strategien zur Wahrung der Freiheitsrechte, in INFORMATIONSGESELLSCHAFT
ODER UBERWACHUNGSSTAAT: STRATEGIEN ZUR WAHRUNG DER FREIHEITSRECHTE
IM COMPUTERZEITALTER: PROTOKOLL 33 (1984) [hereinafter INFORMATIONSGESELL-
sCHAFT] (Symposium der Hessischen Landesregierung, Wiesbaden, Sept. 3-5, 1984)
(noting that measures to reduce administrative expenses contract protection afforded by
the "social security secret," because cost reduction is only possible through exact knowl-
edge about the effect of a particular welfare program).
41 See 13 TB HDSB 21 (1984) (giving examples of the categories of people the
government has warned against).
"' See Computer Matching: Taxpayer Records: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-31 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Senate Hearings] (statement of
Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
48 See Burnham, I.R.S. Seeks Links to County Computers in Texas to Find Debt-
ors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1984, at A23, col. 1.
[Vol. 135:707
PRIVACY AND AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
cated the introduction of an "Australia Card.""" The government hoped
that such a unique personal identifier substantially would improve the
access of the Taxation Office to needed information, particularly by
permitting it to link the various records containing data concerning tax-
payers. The data matching initially would be restricted to government
records. Yet, this limitation may be short-lived. Experience has shown
that national identification systems quickly become integrated into the
private sector, either, as in the case of employees, because of legislative
requirements, or because of peculiar interests of private organizations.45
Thus, in Canada, for example, the identifier is required for activities as
different as opening a bank account, renewing a magazine subscription,
applying for union membership, or borrowing books from a library.
46
The more widespread the use of the identifier, the better the chances of
creating an exhaustive information base through an electronic linkage
of the files.
Sweden provides a good example of a country's attempts to con-
nect data and their implications.47 In Sweden, there is virtually no in-
formation irrelevant to the evaluation of the tax duty. Nearly every
available datum is gathered in order to estimate the amount of the pay-
ment due, including different sources of income, various property items,
buying habits, memberships in professional organizations, charities and
clubs, or vacation travel.' 8
In both social security and taxation, automated processing helps to
define "suspect populations," to identify "hits," and to conduct system-
atic follow-ups. 4' At the same time, however, the burden of proof is
41 See REFORM OF THE AUSTRALIAN TAX SYSTEM 39-40 (1985) (draft White
Paper). For a critical appreciation, see PRIVACY COMMITTrEE, PRIVACY ISSUES AND
THE PROPOSED NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION SCHEME: A SPECIAL REPORT (Mar.
1986) (New South Wales).
45 See CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, REPORT OF THE PRIVACY COMMIS-
SIONER ON THE USE OF THE SOCIAL INSURANCE NUMBER 26-28 (1981) [hereinafter
PRIVACY COMMISSIONER REPORT] (Some organizations stated that they used social
insurance numbers simply to facilitate activities required by law. Others admitted using
the numbers for additional purposes, arguing that such uses were in society's best inter-
ests and therefore should not be hindered by legislative pronouncement or proscrip-
tion.); D. FLAHERTY, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL INSURANCE
NUMBERS IN CANADA (1981).
46 See PRIVACY COMMISSIONER REPORT, supra note 45, at 27-28.
47 See Freese, Verletzlichkeit des Individuums und der Gesellschaft, in 1984 UND
DANACH, supra note 11, at 154, 176; Thoor, Orwell's 1984: The Computer Threat, 7
TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. 139, 139 (1984) (discussing the Swedish social code number,
which "follow[s] every Swedish citizen from his first day of life forever" and is used for
a wide variety of private and public purposes).
48 "Sweden-compared with many other countries-has developed into a trans-
parent aquarium." Freese, supra note 47, at 177.
4' The processing of personal data is indeed symptomatic of a "new awakened
morality" entailing a "hunt for people not fulfilling their obligations towards society."
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reversed. For example, once the computer indicates that a certain per-
son has been receiving benefits without being entitled to them, the ben-
efits may be cut without a hearing. It then falls to the incriminated
person to prove the absence of a violation.5" Instead of requiring the
agency to examine the information provided by the retrieval and to
prove a violation, it becomes the burden of the individual concerned to
explain and justify her behavior. The accusation, therefore, comes very
close to being a conviction.
In Sweden, for example, in the course of a "fishing expedition"
aimed at detecting fraudulent housing aid recipients, perfectly correct
information from a particular file was correlated with equally accurate
data contained in another record. As a result of this matching, one
thousand persons were suspected of having committed fraud. Some of
them were quickly convicted without anyone ever questioning the infor-
mation processing and its possible implications. Ultimately, however,
the government had to admit that only one person out of the one thou-
sand suspects was really guilty.
51
A second, no less important, consequence of automated processing
is the loss of context. 2 The very moment the matching begins, the data
are itemized and disconnected from their original collection situation.
Yet neither hard facts nor judgments can be separated at will from
their context without distorting the information. Consequently, every
step toward routinized processing accentuates the danger of misrepre-
sentations and false conclusions. The more complex a case, the greater
the danger of an improper result. For example, the Medicaid benefits
of an elderly woman living in a Massachusetts nursing home were ter-
minated because, according to a computer match of welfare rolls and
bank accounts, her account exceeded the Medicaid asset limit.5" The
account contained, however, a certificate of deposit in trust that was
intended to cover her funeral expenses. The computer failed to recog-
nize that under federal regulations the certificate of deposit was an ex-
empt resource not to be included in the calculation of her assets for
Freese, supra note 47, at 175.
50 See Bing, supra note 27, at 89; Freese, supra note 47, at 170 (explaining that
today authorities do not contact individuals directly for information but instead consult
data processing files); Marx & Reichman, Routinizing the Discovery of Secrets, 27 AM.
BxsAV. SCIENTIST 423, 440-41 (1984).
51 See Freese, supra note 47, at 172.
1 See Special Report: Sweden's Freese Sees Need for International Privacy Fo-
rum, 2 PRIVAcy TIMEs 8, 9 (Sept. 22, 1982) (linking data that were collected for
different purposes causes a loss of "data quality").
11 See 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 80 (statement of John H. Shat-
tuck, National Legislative Director, ACLU).
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purposes of Medicaid." The payments, therefore, had been proper.
False conclusions caused by the inaccuracy of files, however, are
far more widespread. According to a study initiated by the United
States Office of Technology Assessment, only twelve percent of the
criminal history record summaries routinely transmitted from North
Carolina to law enforcement and other agencies were correct.5" The
figures for California were slightly better, but still not encouraging:
nineteen percent.58 Similarly, the West German experiences demon-
strate that German police records also contain obsolete, ambiguous, or
incorrect data.57 Under these conditions, computer matching inevitably
leads to a proliferation of false information.58 Both the error and the
implications for the persons concerned are magnified.59
Finally, automated processing generates categorizations, especially
when hits are assembled under a particular heading. An individual in-
cluded in the computer-made list is necessarily labeled and henceforth
seen as a member of a group, the peculiar features of which are as-
sumed to constitute her personal characteristics. Whoever appears in
the lists as "tax-evader," "assistance-chiseler," or "porno-film viewer"
must be constantly aware of being addressed as such. She can neither
foresee nor prevent situations in which her connection with one of the
groups constructed by the computer may be raised. 0 For example,
when a movie house operator in Columbus, Ohio, was arrested for
showing obscene movies, one of which was also available on the Qube
pay adult channel program,"1 the defense subpoenaed the subscriber
records of the cable channel to demonstrate that the film did not violate
community standards on obscenity. Although Qube refused to reveal
individual viewing records, it did supply general viewing statistics on
4See id.
55 See D. BURNHAM, supra note 35, at 74.
56 See id.
"' See 11 TB HDSB 70, 126 (1982); 10 TB HDSB 42 (1981).
58 See Bing, supra note 27, at 89.
" See Lowi, Die dritte Revolution: Eine Uberprilfung, in 1984 UND DANACH,
supra note 11, at 99, 125; Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification
Systems, Computer-Matching, and Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J.
991, 1001-04 (assessing various dangers of computer matching).
60 See Bing, supra note 27, at 87; Simitis, supra note 40, at 39 (expressing peo-
pie's fear of being assigned to a certain group, e.g., porno-viewers, based upon external
and possibly irrelevant criteria).
61 See Nash & Smith, Interactive Home Media and Privacy Issues, in REPORT TO
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING 52-57 (1981).
Qube is an interactive cable system that is capable of tracking viewer reception. Qube
offers "adult" channels among its pay cable service selections and can monitor viewer
choices and responses. Although Qube attempts to safeguard this information, questions
of access may arise under certain circumstances, as the Ohio case illustrates.
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the film in question and on general viewing patterns.62
C. Personnel Information Systems: The Well-Adjusted Employee
In September, 1984, the West German Federal Labor Court de-
cided one of its most interesting cases.63 Rank-Xerox had attempted to
establish an information system, the International Technical Service
System, the main purpose of which was to record defects in products, as
well as the sources of the defects, and to improve the supply of neces-
sary spare parts. The data were to be provided by salesmen and techni-
cians through the use of computerized forms. In addition to the data
necessary to carry out the main purpose of the information system, the
firm required technicians to supply certain additional details concerning
their activities. These particular data were then to be matched against
all other information collected by Rank-Xerox on its employees. In
light of the West German Works Constitution Law, which prescribes
that all decisions on technical devices entailing surveillance must be
made jointly by the employer and the works' council," the latter op-
posed the introduction of the International Technical Service System on
the grounds that it infringed the council's co-determination rights. The
question before the court in the Rank-Xerox case was whether this
admittedly very general bargaining provision is also applicable to an
automated retrieval of personnel data."5
All legal considerations aside, the case illustrates the ongoing mod-
6 See Nash & Bollier, Protecting Privacy in the Age of Hometech, TECH. REV.,
Aug./Sept. 1981, at 67, 70.
63 Rank-Xerox case (BAG 1984), 38 NJW 450 (W. Ger.).
BETRIEBSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ [BEmRVG] (Works Constitution Law), BGBl.I
13 (1972), Jan. 15, 1972, last amended Apr. 26, 1985, BGBl.I 710 (1985), art. 87, 1 6
(W. Ger.).
6" For a detailed discussion, see Simitis, Mitbestimmung als Regulativ einer
technisierten Kontrolle von Arbeitnehmern, 38 NJW 401-08.
Similar problems have arisen in Norway and Switzerland. The Norwegian
Worker Protection and Working Environment Act foresees the employer having a duty
to inform the employees, as well as their elected representatives, about any control and
planning systems and to provide the opportunity to learn about and understand these
systems. See Lov. nr. 4 om arbeiderverns of arbeidsmiljo m.v., Feb. 4, 1977, amended
by Act of 13 June 1980, § 12.3 (Nor.), NORGES LOVER 1685-1985, at 2112 (Oslo
1986), available in English translation from Direktoratet for Arbeidstilsynet, Order No.
330. The law also includes confidentiality rules governing data collected about worker
injuries and diseases. See id. § 20. As in West Germany, the applicability of these
rules to rapidly changing retrieval techniques quickly became an extremely controver-
sial issue. In their agreement covering the years 1983-1988, the Swiss Machine- and
Metal-Industry Employers' Association and Unions explicitly stressed the need for reg-
ulating and restricting automated retrieval of personnel data. See VEREINBARUNG UND
VERABREDUNGEN IN DER MASCHINENINDUSTRIE ZWISCHEN DEM ARBEITGEBERVER-
BAND UND DEN ANGESTELLTENVERBXNDEN (Vertragsperiode 1983-1988), art. 11.
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ification of work conditions through the increasing use of personnel in-
formation systems. The development of such systems has been inspired
nearly everywhere by purely administrative preoccupations as employ-
ers are faced with the need to collect more and more data about em-
ployees."6 The traditional terms of employment already entail a consid-
erable amount of information collection because, for example, of the
various forms of remuneration or the exact calculation of leave claims,
sickness payments, and pensions. Furthermore, collective agreements
tend to regulate all aspects of employment. Work conditions can hardly
be "humanized," in the terms of the unions' bargaining policies, with-
out a precise knowledge of the physical and intellectual abilities, the
professional training, and the occupational experiences of the employees
concerned. The consequence of such regulation is once again an inces-
sant accumulation of personal data about employees.
Finally, the employment relationship has become an indispensable
source of information for a whole series of state activities including tax-
ation, occupational health and safety controls, and unemployment
aids 6 7 None of the traditional manual retrieval means can fully cope
with the inflation of data and the constantly varying processing pur-
poses. Personnel information systems therefore constitute the technical
answer to an otherwise unsolvable organizational problem. Employers
have, however, quickly realized that information systems offer at least
two other decisive advantages: better opportunities for control of em-
ployees and improved chances for long-term personnel planning. 8 The
latter has long been one of the main incentives for collecting personnel
data. The information gathered at the beginning of the century by the
Ford Motor Company inspectors on workers' habits and living condi-
tions served no other purpose than to facilitate adaptation to the em-
ployer's expectations. 9 The same intention has led to more and more
66 For an analysis of the background, the techniques and the implications of the
retrieval of personnel data, see S. SIMrrIs, SCHUTZ VON ARBEITNEHMERDATEN,
REGELUNGSDEFIZrrE-L6SUNGSVORSCHLXGE (1980) (report made upon order of the
German Federal Secretary of Labor, stating the unsuitability of existing legal provi-
sions to meet the needs created by the employer-employee relationship).
67 In the United States, for example, statutes enacted for the protection of employ-
ees such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) and the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) have forced employers to gather more information
concerning their employees in order to demonstrate compliance with the statutes. See
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, supra note 35, at 227-28.
68 See Simitis, Gesetzliche Regelungen fir Personalinformationssys-
teme-Chancen und Grenzen, in INFORMATIONSGESELLSCHAFT, supra note 40, at 79.
69 See A. NEVINS, FORD: THE TIMES, THE MAN, THE COMPANY 554-55 (1954)
(detailing the thorough investigations performed by Ford's Sociological Department,
characterized by one head of the department as having "fraternal, not paternal"
purposes).
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sophisticated questionnaires and psychological tests. Each of these in-
struments aims, in the words of most personnel management manuals,
at ensuring the choice of the right worker for the right workplace.
70
Personnel information systems represent a further step in this di-
rection. 71 There is also, however, an obvious qualitative change. Never
before have employers been able to collect and retrieve so much data
about employees. Consequently, the flexibility of personnel policy can
be considerably improved and the demands arising out of both the par-
ticular structure of the workplace and of market conditions better met.
Personnel information systems contribute, therefore, to the rationaliza-
tion of the production process. They mark, in fact, a new and decisive
stage of its taylorization."2
The obvious advantages for the employer have, however, a corre-
sponding cost: increased vulnerability on the part of employees. As the
Rank-Xerox example shows, reliable planning presupposes close con-
trol. The establishment of an information system therefore implies con-
tinuous supervision, for only with continual and careful monitoring of
employees can the necessary data for a risk-minimizing personnel pol-
icy be obtained. Because the system's primary task, however, is an opti-
mal adaptation of the processing to the changing policy aims of the
employer, the exact purposes and potential implications of the data col-
lection are deliberately left open. For example, information on employ-
ees' particular characteristics gathered initially to permit a better selec-
tion of the proper workplace for the employee may, at a later point,
serve as a factor in dismissal."' Similarly, an employer initially may
collect data on employees' means of transportation to the workplace in
order to determine whether to provide busing but can use this data
later when designing a plan for a reduction in personnel.7 4
The greatest advantage of the personnel information system to the
employer-the possibility of using the data for multiple purposes-also
poses the greatest threat to the employees. They must deal with a
70 For a critical analysis of management-employee relations, see R. BENDIX,
WORK AND AUTHORITY IN INDUSTRY: IDEOLOGIES OF MANAGEMENT IN THE
COURSE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 272-73 (1956).
71 See S. SIMMs, supra note 65, at 3-10 (discussing the development and inter-
connection of various information sources).
712 See R. BENDIX, supra note 70, at 274-81 (discussing the work of Frederick W.
Taylor, who advocated "scientific management" through testing of workers in order to
place them in positions for which they are best suited and most efficient, a process now
known as taylorization).
7' For a discussion of the use of seemingly harmless data to the detriment of em-
ployees, see Simitis, supra note 68, at 82, 91; Simitis, supra note 65, at 406 (noting as
examples data on the employee's working performance as well as his absenteeism).
7 See R. NIEBUR, EDV IN BETRIEB UND VERWALTUNG-EINE GEFAHR FU4R
DIE ARBEITNEHMER 60 (1983).
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mechanism, inaccessible to them, that institutionalizes control, thereby
ensuring constant reevaluation of their individual performance. This
surveillance increases the already uncontrollable risk of losing their em-
ployment. Even if employees do not realize the exact implications of an
information system, the mere awareness of a device that minutely
records their activities may be sufficient to influence their behavior.
The pressure resulting from employees' need to retain their jobs and
from the presence of the information system inhibits critical reactions.
The employees tend, instead, to conform to the real or assumed expec-
tations of the employer. Hence, although statutes and collective agree-
ments seek to guarantee a minimum of independence, personnel infor-
mation systems promote a maximum of adjustment.
Another equally important consequence can be observed where
dismissal laws require the employer, especially in cases where the em-
ployer is cutting jobs, to select carefully those employees for whom ter-
mination of the employment relationship would appear to have the
least detrimental effects. 75 Any termination is therefore, in the eyes of
the law, a highly personalized process. The opposite occurs when the
dismissal is based on an automated retrieval of employee data. An em-
ployer can simply have the computerized system produce dismissal lists
established with the help of abstract search criteria. The courts then are
presented with a machine-made decision that is apparently perfectly
objective, precisely because it is machine-made. The responsibility for
deciding which employees to terminate is thus shifted to the computer
and its "impartiality" invoked as the very best proof of the correctness
of the decision.76 Yet, because neither the courts nor the employees con-
75 See, e.g., Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, ch. 44, § 57 (U.K.)
(presenting general provisions relating to fairness of dismissal); Kiindigungs-
schutzgesetz, Aug. 10, 1951, BGBL.I 499 (1951), last amended Apr. 26, 1985, BGBI
710 (1985), § 1, para. 2, no. 1, litt. b (West German dismissal protection law); Simitis,
supra note 34 (comparing the approaches of various countries to labor law).
76 This is only one more example of the widespread quest for computerized deci-
sionmaking techniques, regarded as the long-awaited instrument that permits a defini-
tive replacement of personal judgment by calculations that exclude ambiguities and di-
vergent interpretations of social and political facts. Joseph Weizenbaum has succinctly
described the problem:
What is happening ... is that people have turned the processing of infor-
mation on which decisions must be based over to enormously complex
computer systems. They have, with few exceptions, reserved for themselves
the right to make decisions based on the outcome of such computing
processes. People are thus able to maintain the illusion, and it is often just
that, that they are after all the decisionmakers. But. . . a computing sys-
tem that permits the asking of only certain kinds of questions, that accepts
ony certain kinds of "data," and that cannot even in principle be under-
stood by those who rely on it, such a computing system has effectively
closed many doors that were open before it was installed.
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cerned have the opportunity and the competence to oversee the pro-
grams used in generating the lists, there is no guarantee that all rele-
vant factors and circumstances have actually been considered.
Furthermore, employees are deprived of the already scant opportunity
to discuss their viewpoints with the employer and to refute her argu-
ments directly.
D. Conclusions
Although the examples discussed above cover very different areas,
a few general conclusions nevertheless can be drawn. First, none of the
experiences stated is exclusively typical of a single country. Despite the
fact that the conditions under which medical data are retrieved, social
security measures designed, or personnel information systems imple-
mented vary according to the particular political, economic, and legal
framework, the same problems can be observed in many countries.
Each of the examples reflects conflicts characteristic of every industrial-
ized and highly developed technological society. It is, therefore, not sur-
prising that opinion polls reveal a growing concern for individual pri-
vacy that clearly transcends national boundaries. In a 1982 poll
conducted in Canada on public attitudes toward computer technology,
sixty-five percent of the persons surveyed identified invasion of privacy
as their main concern. 77 A year later, eighty-four percent of those
polled in the United States thought that a file containing credit infor-
mation, employment data, phone calls, buying habits, and travel could
easily be compiled.78 Also, in 1983, sixty percent of those surveyed in
West Germany felt that computers have already given the state too
many opportunities for control." Americans were more explicit. Sev-
J. WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER PowER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT TO
CALCULATION 38 (1976); see also H. ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 9-11 (1972)
(characterizing the professional "problemsolvers" in the high ranks of government as
individuals eager to discover reliable information and laws to explain and predict
human affairs).
77 See Diebel, Privacy and the Computer State, MACLEAN'S, Jan. 9, 1984, at 34,
35-36; see also Vidmar & Flaherty, Concern for Personal Privacy in an Electronic
Age, J. COMM. 91, 103 (Spring 1985) (presenting other data that "reflect genuine fears
and concerns, directed toward both government and private business" concerning the
collection of personal information).
78 See Privacy and 1984: Public Opinions on Privacy Issues, Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16
(1984) [hereinafter Privacy and 1984].
79 See Becker, Burger in der modernen Informationsgesellschaft, in INFORMA-
TIONSGESELLSCHAFT ODER UBERWACHUNGSSTAAT: STRATEGIEN ZUR WAHRUNG DER
FREIHEITSRECHTE IM COMPUTERZEITALTER: GUTACHTEN 414 (1984) (Symposium
der Hessischen Landesregierung, Wiesbaden, Sept. 3-5, 1984). At the same time 65%
stated that as little information as possible should be given to the state. The percentage
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enty percent appear to be convinced that government will take advan-
tage of the chances offered by technology in order to intimidate individ-
uals or groups.80 Hence, both experiences with the retrieval of personal
data and the widespread distrust of those with access to personnel in-
formation systems demonstrate the universality of the problems created
by intensive computerization. They also show that a discussion of its
consequences inevitably leads to a debate on the structure and organiza-
tion of society.
Second, the examples refute the widespread assumption that the
implications of automated processing of personal data are only a by-
product of the expansionist policies of an activist state. Certainly, the
enormous increase in the information collected corresponds to a consid-
erable extent to the changes in state activities. Nearly every new task
assumed by the welfare administration multiplies the demand for per-
sonal data. It is therefore not surprising that countries like Sweden or
Norway, which have well-established interventionist traditions, are
particularly inclined to design both preventive and repressive policies
with the help of an automated processing system.
Yet, even in the United States, whose traditions are normally not
inclined to favor state activism, the federal government has not hesitated
to use automated processing in both the taxation"' and social security
fields.82 There is, of course, one striking difference between the United
States and countries favoring more state involvement: the United States'
lack of comprehensive state data banks. Yet this difference has never
proved to be a serious obstacle. There are enough private files in the
United States providing a perfectly satisfactory substitute. Hence, the
information can either be obtained by a direct linkage or, as the IRS
example shows, by simply buying marketing lists and matching them
against the data already collected by the various branches of
rose to 76% when the same question was put with regard to private firms. Id. at 413.
80 See Privacy and 1984, supra note 78, at 20.
"i See, e.g., 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 25-40 (statement of Roscoe
L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue) (describing the variety of informa-
tion services used by the IRS to ensure that information voluntarily provided by tax-
payers is correct).
82 In 1974, the same year that Congress was passing the Privacy Act, it
amended the Social Security Act to require all welfare recipients to dis-
close social security numbers in order to receive benefits, and to require
[the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] to establish a com-
puterized Parent Locator Service with authority to tap any other federal
agency's data banks (notably Social Security and Internal Revenue Service
records) to find the last known address of an absent parent not supporting
a child.
D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY AND GOVERNMENT DATA BANKS: AN INTERNATIONAL PER-
SPECTIVE 285 (1979).
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government.8
Third, the aim of controlling and adjusting individual behavior is
by no means an exclusive attribute of processing activities initiated by
the state. Both the retrieval of medical data by insurance companies
and the establishment of personnel information systems make it clear
that private enterprises and state agencies resort to automated process-
ing for quite similar purposes. Consequently, when the State of Hesse,
West Germany, decided to introduce a personnel information system
for schoolteachers,84 techniques corresponding to those used by chemi-
cal or automobile firms were adopted. Furthermore, as in the case of
employment relationships, data originally collected for the government
are to a large extent also retrieved for clearly private purposes. Simi-
larly, information gathered by private firms is, as demonstrated by the
experiences of banks85 and credit card companies,86 again and again
processed by the government. The boundaries between the public and
private sectors are thus blurred. Personal data, once stored, tend to be-
come a flexible, common base of information.
Fourth, because of both the broad availability of personal data and
the elaborate matching procedures, individual activities can be accu-
rately reconstructed through automated processing. Surveillance be-
comes the order of the day. Significantly enough, security agencies were
among the first to discover the advantages of automated retrieval.
87
88 See, e.g., 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 25 (statement of Roscoe L.
Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue)
Commercial lists can reflect a variety of information, but typically they
would show such things as the names of heads of households and estimates
of household incomes. Private companies prepare these lists using publicly
available records, such as telephone listings, motor vehicle registrations,
real estate transactions and public/aggregate census data .... The IRS
is attempting to determine if commercial lists can supplement a variety of
other efforts to identify persons who fail to file returns.
Id.; Burnham, IRS Buys Company's List of Names, Incomes to Track U.S. Tax Evad-
ers, Int'l Herald Tribune, Dec. 27, 1983, at 3, col.7.
" See 12 TB HDSB 94-95 (1983); 9 TB HDSB 55 (1980).
85 See, e.g., PRIVAcY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, supra note 35, at 103-05
(describing the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, which requires depository institutions to
maintain particular records on individuals and to report specific transactions to the
government).
86 See, e.g., id. at 52-55 (describing methods by which a government agency can
gain access to a credit card issuer's records).
817 See, e.g., 6 Intelligence Activities: Hearings on S. Res. 21 Before the Senate
Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activi-
ties, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975) [hereinafter Intelligence Activities] (testimony of
Curtis R. Smothers, Counsel to the Minority, Senate Select Committee to Study Gov-
ernmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities) ("The [FBI] with its 59
field offices staffed by more than 9,500 special agents, maintains a data bank on citi-
zens which includes criminal information, and this investigative data bank . . . grows
[Vol. 135:707
PRIVACY AND AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
They not only quickly computerized their own data collections but also
sought and obtained access to state and private data banks."" Entirely
new investigation techniques, such as computer profiling, were devel-
oped, enabling the agencies to trace wanted persons by matching a pre-
sumptive pattern of consumption habits against, for instance, 'the
records of utility companies.8 9 The successful attempts at computer-
based voice and picture identification9" will probably influence the
work of security agencies even more.
Although the purposes vary, the surveillance methods used by dif-
ferent institutions are astonishingly similar. "Mobility profiles," for ex-
ample, were first introduced by the police authorities. 1 Data collected
in the course of repeated controls at various selected places were sys-
daily. . . ."); Herold, Kfinftige Einsatzformen der EDV und ihre Auswirkungen im
Bereich der Polizei, 9 KRIMINALISTIK 388 (1974); Herold, Organisatorische
Grundzfige der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung im Bereich der Polizei, 18 TA-
SCHENBUCH FfR KRIMINALISTEN 240 (1968) (stating that use of electronic data
processing requires a different organizational structure of police agencies).
"B See, e.g., 6 Intelligence Activities, supra note 87, at 367 (information gathered
for FBI data banks was collected 50% of the time from state Motor Vehicles Division
confidential sources in utilities, educational institutions, and state employment agen-
des); 13 TB HDSB 98-99, 117, 119 (1984) (discussing police access to data of federal
office of motor traffic and to identity card data, establishment of data bank on activities
endangering the security of the state, and the Hessian evidentiary retrieval system); 12
TB HDSB 33 (1983) (noting the establishment of a federal data bank for criminal
investigation material); D. BURNHAM, supra note 35, at 39, 66, 106, 169-71, 200;
"CNIL, 2LME RAPPORT, supra note 30, at 70 (1982) (delineating standards for access
to and use of information possessed by the military and police); BUNDESKRIMINALAMT
WIESBADEN, POLIZEILICHE DATENVERARBEITUNG (1983) (Arbeitstagung des
Bundeskriminalamtes, Wiesbaden, Nov. 2-5, 1982) (discussing development and possi-
ble applications of electronic data processing); G. WIESEL & H. GERSTER, DAs IN-
FORMATIONSSYSTEM DER POLIZEI INPOL: KONZEPT UND SACHSTAND 30-32 (1978)
(the central information system of the West German police transmits information that
is collected and stored by the states and retrieved at the federal criminal office
(Bundeskriminalamt)); Herold, Perspektiven im Bereich der Sicherheitsbehirden, in
INFORMATIONSGESELLSCHAFr, supra note 40, at 207, 213 (discussing technical pros-
pects of modem data processing); Note, Government Monitoring of International Elec-
tronic Communications: National Security Agency Watch List Surveillance and the
Fourth Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 429 (1978) (describing how the National
Security Agency intercepts international communications, processes them, and forwards
them to other government agencies).
" See 3 TXTIGKEITSBERICHT DES BUNDESBEAUFTRAGTER FUR DEN DATEN-
SCHUTZ 50-51 (1981) [hereinafter TB BFD] (examining the use of automated files by
the West German federal criminal office, "Bundeskriminalamt"); 7 TB BFD 60 (1985)
(discussing risks of new computer investigative techniques); J. SIMON & J. TAEGER,
RASTERFAHNDUNG 25 (1981) (analyzing the matching of data from gas, power, and
water companies in several West German cities against consumption patterns of a list
of wanted persons established by the Bundeskriminalamt).
9o See Herold, supra note 88, at 214, 221; Krickeberg, Informationstechnologie
der Zukunfi, in POLIZEILICHE DATENVERARBEITUNG, supra note 88, at 47-49.
*1 See 12 TB HDSB 58, 63 (1983); 4 TB BFD 30-32 (1982) (discussing the
collection of data by the German federal border guard, "Bundesgrenzschutz").
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tematically matched against the information contained in police data
banks. The outcome was fit into individual criminal profiles indicating
the habitual means of transport and the usual destinations, as well as
the preferred lodging, and describing thus both the degree and the de-
tails of mobility of criminals. In the meantime, credit card companies
adopted a comparable procedure in order to uncover fraudulent use of
cards as quickly as possible.92 The profiles are created by combining
customer spending and travelling customs. All further uses of the par-
ticular credit card are matched against the individual's profile. Devia-
tions from the recorded and computer-affirmed "normality" result in
an additional, more thorough check before the charge to the card is
accepted.
The close connection between the advances in retrieval techniques
and the intensification of surveillance is probably best illustrated by the
videotex experiences.9" Interactive cable television services are already
offered for catalog shopping, burglary and fire protection, electronic
funds transfers, home monitoring of children and the elderly, energy
management, and emergency medical assistance." In each of these
92 See Unbeantwortete Datenschutzfragen, Blick durch die Wirtschaft, Nov. 27,
1985, at 1, col. 2.
" For a general appreciation, see CNIL, 5iME RAPPORT D'AcTIVITt, 15
OcTOBRE 1983 - 31 DfICEMBRE 1984, at 145 (1984) (describing related changes in
information processing and notions of freedom); 7 TB BFD 24 (1985) (describing intro-
duction and problems with German videotex system "Bildschirmtext" (Btx)); 12 TB
HDSB 102-03 (1983) (discussing prevention of abuse of personal data in videotex
processing); Nash & Bollier, supra note 62, at 67-72 (discussing the threat posed to
individual privacy by interactive home-media because hometech information could be
compiled to create an individual activity profile usable by other private and public
agencies); Wachtel, Videotex: A Welcome New Technology or an Orwellian Threat to
Privacy?, 2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 287, 290 (1983) ("[Videotex] systems opera-
tors will be collecting massive amounts of personal data from subscribers. Whether the
subscriber is ordering goods and services, answering inquiries, retrieving information,
or utilizing the security services, he will be conveying his interests, choices, and views to
the central computer."); Westin, Home Information Systems: The Privacy Debate, 28
DATAMATION 100 (July 1982) (describing ways cable television and telephone-based
systems can be utilized by consumers, the dangers of private and public agencies gain-
ing access to the personal information collected by the cable companies, and the need
for individual protection through adoption of an industry code regulating information
use); Comment, Cable Television Privacy Act: Protecting Privacy Interest from Emerg-
ing Cable TV Technology, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 71, 79 (1983) (describing the danger
of unauthorized access to private communications of consumers in the cable television
industry).
" See 13 TB HDSB 60 (1984) (describing German TEMEX service which al-
lows control of almost entire household); Nash & Smith, supra note 61, at 33-37
(describing Qube system, which uses interactive communication to assess viewer re-
sponses, bill for pay-TV services, and monitor home security); Westin, supra note 93,
at 100, 103 (categorizing uses of cable television and telephone-based systems into eight
groups: home banking, shop-at-home services, information services, home and personal
security services, instant opinion polling, home study courses, special entertainment op-
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cases, the subscriber's everyday life is painstakingly recorded. 5 A home
modem, for instance, collects information from meters, hot water heat-
ers, television sets, or any other major appliance by scanning the house-
hold up to every six seconds in order not only to control energy con-
sumption but also to develop, if necessary, alternative patterns. The
same mechanism applies to the monitoring services. The system con-
ducts continuous sweeps of the subscriber's house and can thus con-
stantly locate the persons to be surveyed. Where, therefore, anonymity
was once the rule, complete transparency now dominates. It is little
wonder that security agencies, advertisers, and direct-mail marketers
have repeatedly underlined their interest in getting access to individual
"home profiles."9 Videotex is, therefore, further proof of the steady,
but often imperceptible, transition in social control from physical coer-
cion to observation and surveillance.9 7 Automated processing paves the
way to conformity by constantly improving the opportunities to follow
and to retrace the individual's activities.98
III. REVIEWING PRIVACY
A. Privacy-A Refuge for the Individual
The implications of automated processing can be viewed as merely
tions, and organizational fund raising).
95 See, e.g., 13 TB HDSB 60-61 (1984); Nash & Bollier, supra note 62, at 70
(household information that advertisers, direct-mail marketers, and cable television op-
erators assemble can form a "psychographic" profile of an individual's activities);
Wachtel, supra note 93, at 295 (describing how home media systems can put together a
"home profile" of an individual's activities by compiling the massive amount of per-
sonal data acquired from a subscriber); Westin, supra note 93, at 103 (system operator
can collect almost unlimited information about the subscriber's activities).
91 See 13 TB HDSB 59-60 (1984); Nash & Smith, supra note 61, at 8-9; Nash &
Bollier, supra note 62, at 70 (discussing the interest of private enterprises in "home
profiles"); Westin, supra note 93, at 103, 111.
7 In the 19th century, the prison system arose as the dominant form of punish-
ment particularly because it provided a place to observe punished individuals. The
prison system made it possible "to substitute for force or other violent constraints the
gentle efficiency of total surveillance." M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE
BIRTH OF THE PRISON 249 (A. Sheridan trans. 1977).
'a See, e.g., Marx & Reichman, supra note 50, at 442.
Rather than having to rely on what citizens happen to report or police
accidentally discover, [social] control agents are taking greater initiative.
...With a skeptical and scientific ethos and a broad data base that can
be inexpensively screened, it becomes prudent to consider everyone a pos-
sible suspect initially. Analysis rather than tradition becomes the basis for
action.
Id.; Simitis, Datenschutz: Voraussetzung oder Ende der Kommunikation, in 2
EUROPXISCHES RECHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART 513-14 (1982)
(Festschrift ffir Helmut Coing).
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a personal problem for the individuals concerned, because it is their
data that are stored and retrieved and their activities and habits that
are recorded. Indeed, until recently, most courts and legislators have
seen no need for another approach. Consequently, as both the history
and the text of the West German Federal Data Protection Act99 and
the Swiss draft 00 show, legislators and courts have legitimated data
protection regulation by simple reference to traditional privacy
concepts.
Processing problems are thus largely dealt with in terms already
suggested in the course of the French Revolution and confirmed nearly
170 years later by article nine of the Code Civil: Everyone has the right
to the protection of her private life. 01 Saint-Just's famous state-
ment-"La libert6 du people est dans sa vie privee; ne la troublez
point. Que le gouvernement ...ne soit une force que pour prot~ger
cet &at de simplicit6 contre la force mame" 102-not only rejects an au-
tocratic political order but also expresses the conviction that a society
that considers the freedom of individuals to act as its paramount regula-
tory principle must distinguish clearly between private and public life
and preserve the intimacy of the former. 0"
The same view is found again in Warren and Brandeis's passion-
ate pleading for the individual's right to be let alone.1 04 Faced with
99 See BDSG, § 1, 1 1. Section 1(1) describes the task of the law in rather un-
usual terms that are not easily understandable: to secure the "interests worthy of pro-
tection" of those concerned by data processing against its misuse. The meaning is nev-
ertheless clear as the legislative materials show: to protect the personal interests of the
individuals affected by the storage and retrieval of their data and thus to ensure the free
development of their personality. See ENTWURF DES BDSG, BUNDESTAGS-DRUCK-
SACHE 7/1027, at 22; S. SIMITIS, U. DAMMANN, 0. MALLMANN & H.J. REH, KOM-
MENTAR ZUM BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ 94 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter KoM-
MENTAR ZUM BDSG].
100 EIDGEN6SSISCHES JUSTIZ- UND POLIZEIDEPARTMENT, BUNDESGESETZ OBER
DEN SCHUTZ VON PERSONENDATEN: ENTWURF arts. 8-12, 36 (Dec. 5, 1983) [herein-
after Swiss draft data protection law); EIDGEN6SSISCHES JUSTIZ- UND
POLIZEIDEPARTMENT, ERLXUTERNDER BERICHT ZUM ENTWURF EINES
BUNDESGESETZES 0IBER DEN SCHUTZ VON PERSONENDATEN 11, 30, 63 (Dec. 1983)
(legislative comments on Swiss draft).
101 C. Civ. art. 9 ("Chacun a droit au respect de sa vie privfe.").
102 A. DE SAINT-JUST, Fragments sur les institutions rkpublicaines, in 2
OEUVRES COMPLTES 492, 507 (C. Vellay ed. 1908) ("The liberty of the people lies in
their private lives; do not disturb it. Let the government . . . be a force only to protect
this state of simplicity against force itself . . ").
103 See also J. BONNECASE, LA PHILOSOPHIE DU CODE NAPOL9ON APPLIQUtE
AU DROIT DE FAMILLE 84-85 (1928) (stating that examples such as the purely contrac-
tual view of marriage, establishing its free dissolubility, emphasize the sharp distinction
between private and public life brought about by the French Constitution of 1791).
104 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205. They state:
[T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed
through the medium of writing or of the arts. . . is merely an instance of
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changes in the means of communication, they upheld and defended the
right to an undisturbed private life.10 5 Behind the claim for legally
guaranteed privacy lies the expectation of all those who supported in-
dustrial expansion, advocated political and economic structures elimi-
nating all obstacles to entrepreneurial initiative, and who regarded suc-
cess, not birth, as the sole criterion legitimating social distinctions.
Their desire was to enjoy, strictly for themselves and under conditions
they determined, the fruits of their economic and social activity.106 The
right to be let alone was therefore increasingly hypostatized: privacy
was considered a natural right binding courts and legislators. It permits
and secures withdrawal from society. The citoyen's access to informa-
tion ends where the bourgeois' claim for privacy begins.
The more, therefore, that privacy is equated with a deliberate and
legally protected seclusion of the individual, the more the right to be let
alone develops into an impediment to the transparency necessary for a
democratic decisionmaking process. As long as the data required to un-
derstand and evaluate the political and economic process are withheld,
suppressed, or falsified, participation remains a pure fiction. Hence,
publicity, and not secrecy, has been the outstanding feature of all efforts
to secure participation in all aspects of decisionmaking.
Because the existence of a democratic society depends essentially
on an uninhibited proliferation of information, privacy very quickly be-
came one of the main objects of debate. In fact, free speech has been
the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone.
It is like the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be impris-
oned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be
defamed.
1o5 See id. at 195. Additionally, they state:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to
the individual . . . the right 'to be let alone.' Instantaneous photographs
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life . . . . [O]f the desirability-indeed of the necessity-of some
such protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt.
110 For a discussion of the political and social background of the period during
which the need for a right of privacy became explicitly recognized, see G. BLODGETT,
THE GENTLE REFORMERS: MASSACHUSETTS DEMOCRATS IN THE CLEVELAND ERA
(1966) (detailing the roots and development of the Mugwumps, a group of nineteenth-
century political independents); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 348-49 (1967)
(stating that the privacy movement was "essentially a protest by spokesmen for patri-
cian values against the rise of the political and cultural values of 'mass society' ");
Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890):
Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 875 (1979) (criticizing the
frequently cited Warren and Brandeis article as merely espousing the minority view of
newsworthiness of the Mugwumps and attempting to create and romanticize a new
legal right of privacy based on this view).
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seen, to a substantial extent, as a product of the constant adjustment of
the boundary between the individual's right to be let alone and the
public's need to be informed. The standard remarks on the relative na-
ture of privacy or on the necessity of a careful balancing of interests
10 7
are more than significant. Far from being considered a constitutive ele-
ment of a democratic society, privacy appears as a tolerated contradic-
tion, the implications of which must be continuously reconsidered. The
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,0 8 Lebach,'09 Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 110 and KohllBiedenkopf " cases all illustrate the constant to
and fro between the effort to improve transparency and the tendency to
preserve some degree of inaccessibility.
B. Privacy-A Condition of Participation
Both the quest for greater transparency and the defense of free
speech are legitimated by the goal of allowing the individual to under-
107 Examples can be easily found in the decisions of most courts. For West Ger-
many, see, e.g., Soraya case, 34 BVerfGE 269, 280-82 (1973) (stating that even where
the conflict at stake concerns at first only the relationship between purely private par-
ties, the need to respect and ensure the freedom of the press may restrict the individ-
ual's right to the free development of her personality); Panorama, 66 BGHZ 183, 186-
87 (1976) (describing interests to be balanced in evaluating critical comments made on
German public television); M. F.-Bank case, 36 BGHZ 80 (1961) (advocating restric-
tions of privacy protection in cases of publications concerning business activities). For
Switzerland, see, e.g., Judgment of Sept. 23, 1982, 108 BGE II at 344, 344 (stating
that a person who intentionally and repeatedly disturbs the family life of a married
couple by claiming to be the father of their children violates the privacy right of the
couple); Judgment of July 3, 1975, 101 BGE II at 177, 197 (stating that a violation of
the privacy right is not illegal when mandated by superior interests and that the deci-
sion on illegality depends on the balancing of the competing interests); see also M.
PEDRAZZINI & N. OBERHOLZER, GRUNDRISS DES PERSONENRECHTS 134-35 (2d ed.
1985) (discussing balancing of interests in application of ZGB art. 28, para. 1 (Switz.).
For an overview of the various interests directly connected to retrieval problems, see
Morand, Probl~mes constitutionnels relatifs a la protection de la personnalitg a
l'gard des banques de donnies glectroniques, in INFORMATIQUE ET PROTECTION DE
LA PERSONNALITA 15, 19-33 (1981) (assessing the individual interest in privacy and
effective functioning of government).
log 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that mere factual error in a defamation case is
insufficient to warrant an award of damages).
109 Judgment of June 5, 1973, 35 BVerfGE 202 (The constitution's protection of
privacy does not allow television to invade the private sphere of a criminal offender
beyond normal reporting. Later reporting, e.g., in the form of a documentary film, is
impermissible when it harms the individual, particularly if her rehabilitation is put at
risk.).
110 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (refusing to extend the Sullivan rule to require actual
knowledge of falsehood in a defamation action brought by a "public figure").
"I1 Judgment of Dec. 19, 1978, 73 BGHZ 120, 129 (In discussing a case involv-
ing the publication of a private telephone call between two high-ranking German poli-
ticians, the court stated that only a very serious need on the part of the public for
information could justify such exposure of the individual's private sphere.).
[Vol. 135:707
PRIVACY AND AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
stand social reality better and thus to form a personal opinion on its
decisive factors as well as on possible changes. The citizen's right to be
(Ca participator in the government of affairs," to use Jefferson's
terms, 112 reflects a profoundly rational process. It presupposes individu-
als who not only disperse the necessary information but also have the
capacity to transform the accessible data into policy expectations.
Transparency is, in other words, a basic element of competent commu-
nicative action 1 and consequently remains indispensible as long as so-
cial discourse is to be promoted, not inhibited.
Inhibition, however, tends to be the rule once automated process-
ing of personal data becomes a normal tool of both government and
private enterprises. The price for an undoubted improvement in trans-
parency is a no less evident loss in competence of communication. Hab-
its, activities, and preferences are compiled, registered, and retrieved to
facilitate better adjustment, not to improve the individual's capacity to
act and to decide. Whatever the original incentive for computerization
may have been, processing increasingly appears as the ideal means to
adapt an individual to a predetermined, standardized behavior that
aims at the highest possible degree of compliance with the model pa-
tient, consumer, taxpayer, employee, or citizen. Furthermore, interac-
tive systems do not, despite all contrary assertions,1 4 restore a long lost
individuality by correcting the effects of mass production in a mass soci-
ety. On the contrary, the telematic integration forces the individual once
more into a preset scheme. The media supplier dictates the conditions
under which communication takes place, fixes the possible subjects of
the dialogue, and, due to the personal data collected, is in an increas-
ingly better position to influence the subscriber's behavior. Interactive
systems, therefore, suggest individual activity where in fact no more
than stereotyped reactions occur. 5
In short, the transparency achieved through automated processing
11 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (February 2, 1816), in 14
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 417, 422 (Monticello ed. 1904).
113 For the concept and the premises of a competent theory of communicative ac-
tion, see J. HABERMAS, I THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 75-102, 273-
338 (1983).
1" See, e.g., E. FEIGENBAUM & P. MCCORDUCK, THE FIFTH GENERATION
(1983) (suggesting that the development of computer technology or artificial intelligence
is the means of acquiring power and pre-eminence); A. TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE
200-02 (1980) (suggesting that individuals will not be dominated by technology and
that technological processes will be "increasingly under the direct control of the con-
sumer" because changes in technology and information storage and collection are mov-
ing manufacturing beyond traditional mass production).
115 See Rodota, supra note 11, at 201; S. GARDNER & R. WHITE, NEW TECH-
NOLOGY AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: STATE RESPONSES TO FEDERAL INACTION, A
REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION BOARD (1983).
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creates possibly the best conditions for colonization of the individual's
lifeworld. 11' Accurate, constantly updated knowledge of her personal
history is systematically incorporated into policies that deliberately
structure her behavior. The more routinized automated processing aug-
ments the transparency, however, the more privacy proves to be a pre-
requisite to the capacity to participate in social discourse. Where pri-
vacy is dismantled, both the chance for personal assessment of the
political and societal process and the opportunity to develop and main-
tain a particular style of life fade.
For precisely this reason the West German Federal Constitutional
Court, in the National Census Case ("Volkszhlungsurteil")-its
landmark decision on the census law-spoke of the individual's right to
an "informational self-determination".11 According to the court, un-
restricted access to personal data imperils virtually every constitution-
ally guaranteed right. Neither freedom of speech nor freedom of associ-
ation nor freedom of assembly can be fully exercized as long as it
remains uncertain whether, under what circumstances, and for what
purposes, personal information is collected and processed. In view of
these implications of automated data processing, considerations of pri-
vacy protection involve more than any one particular right: they deter-
mine the choice between a democratic and an authoritarian society."l 8
If, as Jefferson suggests, democratic participation presupposes con-
"' For both the colonization process and the impact of the individual's lifeworld
on communicative action, see J. HABERMAS, supra note 113, at 70-71 (defining
"lifeworld" as shared understandings about what will be treated as a fact, valid norms,
and subjective experience); J. HABERMAS, 2 THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN
HANDELNS: ZUR KRITIK DER FUNKTIONALISTISCHEN VERNUNFT 173 (1981).
1.. Volksz~hlungsurteil, 65 BVerfGE 1, 68-69 (1983). The National Census Stat-
ute, Gesetz fiber eine Volks-, Berufs-, Wohnungs- und Arbeitsstittenzihlung (Volks-
zihlungsgesetz), Mar. 25, 1982, BGBl.I 369 (1982) ordered West German citizens to
disclose personal data and foresaw a transmission of the information to the various
branches of government. The Court held major portions of the statute to be unconstitu-
tional especially because it did not explicitly exclude uses of the data other than those
for exclusively statistical purposes.
11 See Maisl & Vitalis, Les libertgs: enjeu d'une sociitg inform atis~e, 1985
ETUDES 471 (examining the general effects of an information society on individual and
collective liberties and advocating greater public participation at earlier stages of deci-
sionmaking about information use); RodotA, supra note 11, 196-198 (referring to a
1968 U.N. resolution regarding use of electronics as an interference with citizens'
rights). Significantly enough, the French legislature deliberately avoided the term "data
protection" and spoke instead of "informatique et liberts"-automated processing and
liberties-thus stressing the necessity of a broader view and clearly underscoring the
structural importance of efficient privacy protection for the existence of a democratic
society, see CNIL, RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION INFORMATIQUE ET LIBERT.S 16-23,
83-85 (1975) (indicating the necessity of enabling individuals to be aware of and to
discuss the various uses of automated processing).
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stant interaction between public and private life,119 the protection of
privacy must be accompanied by an equally efficient, guaranteed access
to the information necessary to follow and evaluate social processes. In-
deed, the very first step to cope with the implications of automated re-
trieval, the 1970 Hessian Data Protection Act, included a series of ac-
cess rules.'20 Fourteen years later, the Quebec Act addressed both data
protection and freedom of information in a single statute.121 Each of
these laws has a clearly limited scope, covering access in only a few
selected instances. 122 They nonetheless reveal that social discourse de-
pends on an information allocation policy that, through a mix of with-
holding and access, reflects a precise analysis and understanding of the
consequences of automated processing for both the individual and soci-
ety. 2 The contrary result is achieved, however, when privacy protec-
tion is more or less equated with an individual's right to decide when
and which data are to be accessible. The regulation thus reverts to
well-known property schemes and leads to the division and monopoli-
'19 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, supra note 112, at
422-23; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (May 20, 1782), in 4
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 193, 196 (Monticello ed. 1904) ("Nothing
could so completely divest us of ... liberty as the establishment of the opinion, that the
State has a perpetual right to the services of all its members.").
120 See Datenschutzgesetz, Oct. 7, 1970, § 6, 1 Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt fiir
das Land Hessen 625 (1970) (West German state of Hesse data protection act). For
the history and development of the law, see Simitis, Datenschutzrecht, in HESSisCHES
STAATS- UND VERWALTUNGSRECHT 111-114 (H. Meyer & M. Stolleis eds. 1983).
"I An Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Pro-
tection of Personal Information (as last amended on July 4, 1984), Qui. REv. STAT.
ch. A-2.1 (1984); see also QUEBEC MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION
ET LIBERTA: RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION D'I-TUDE SUR L'ACCES DU CITOYEN 1
L'INFORMATION GOUVERNEMENTALE ET SUR LA PROTECTION DES RENSEIGNEMENTS
PERSONNELS 14-18 (1981) (discussing the need for comprehensive legislation that
would result from public debate over and consensual resolution of the issues surround-
ing the regulation of information).
122 The access to personal data for research purposes, see Datenschutzgesetz, Nov.
11, 1986, § 33, 1 Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt fiir das Land Hessen 309 (1986)
[hereinafter 3d Hessian Data Protection Act], the openness of documents held by public
bodies, see An Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the
Protection of Personal Information (as last amended on July 4, 1984), QuE. REv.
STAT. ch. A-2.1 (1984), and the balance of information between Parliament and gov-
ernment, see 3d Hessian Data Protection Act, §§ 1(2), 24(2), are probably the most
typical examples. See also Lov. nr. 293 om private registre m.v. (Private Registers Act),
June 8, 1978, § 2(2), 2 Karnovs Lovsamling 2859 (1978) (Den.), reprinted in 5 Com-
puter Law Serv. (Callaghan) app. 9-5.2a, no. 6 (1979) (protection does not apply to
data collected for scientific, statistical, or biographical research).
12M See CNIL, 3iME RAPPORT D'ACTIVIT, 15 OCTOBRE 1981 - 15 OCTOBRE
1982, at 65 (1983) (specifying that freedom of access law extends access to noncom-
puterized files not protected by the privacy law); Maisl & Vitalis, supra note 118, at
477 (urging an aggressive and comprehensive approach to organizing and planning the
processing of technological information).
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zation of personal information. 24 Public and private life are irrevoca-
bly disconnected. Open or hidden "sanctifications" of property sacrifice
the citoyen 125 and reduce the constitutio libertatis to a mere guarantee
of the bourgeois' refuge.
The reports of the West German Data Protection Agencies, espe-
cially on retrieval practices in the insurance, credit, and medical sec-
tor1 28 and the remarks of the United States Privacy Protection Study
Commission on access to data of "captive populations" 127 demonstrate
the chimerical nature of the assumption that effective protection of pri-
vacy can be accomplished by simply entrusting the processing decision
to the persons concerned. Whether or not the details of the intended
retrieval are explained to them, hospital patients, bank customers, and
employees cannot determine the proper data processing conditions, even
though their consent to disclosure of information is required.,28 The
I24 See H. MEISTER, DATENSCHUTZ IM ZIVILRECHT 111, 113 (1977). For a crit-
ical appreciation, see A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA
BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 211-16 (1971) (criticizing use of property notions as means of
regulation on grounds that they are irrelevant and inappropriate); KOMMENTAR ZUM
BDSG, supra note 99, at 272. Therefore, as appropriate as it may appear to define
privacy as the individual's claim to determine the conditions under which personal in-
formation can be disseminated, see A. MILLER, supra, at 25; A. WESTIN, supra note
106, at 7, this definition encourages the widespread tendency to disregard the indissolu-
ble connection between data protection and freedom of information. As a consequence,
inconsistencies and contradictions burden the attempts to establish rules governing the
allocation of information. For a detailed discussion, see, for example, Kronman, The
Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEG. STUDIES 727 (1980)
(discussing the balance of data protection and access from the perspective of maximiz-
ing economic efficiency).
125 See H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 255-56 (1965).
128 See, e.g., 7 TB BFD 83 (1985); 5 TB BFD 75 (1983); 2 TB BFD 55 (1980)
(all discussing data protection in insurance and banking fields); 13 TB HDSB 115
(1984); 12 TB HDSB 82 (1983); 11 TB HDSB 22 (1982) (all discussing data banks
in medical and psychiatric fields).
127 See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, supra note 35, at 85-87, 196-
198, 314-316.
128 Consider the debate on the need for specific privacy protection regulation in
view of the implications of videotex. Not only has the individual's right to choose what
should be revealed been repeatedly stressed, but, as the Warner Amex Cable Commu-
nications Code of Privacy (1981) or the Model Privacy Guidelines for Videotex Sys-
tems released in 1983 by the Videotex Industry Association show, the proposals for
self-regulation that were developed were clearly intended to preempt attempts at state
intervention. See Neustadt & Swanson, Privacy and Videotex Systems, 8 BYTE 98, 98
(July 1983), reprinted in 1984: Civil Liberties and the National Security State, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 103-04 (1983-84).
Both the experience with retrieval of subscriber data and a close study of the various
rules reveal, however, that the assumed control and interference opportunities are ficti-
tious, due to the deliberately vague formulation of the policies and the subtleties of the
disclaimers. Additionally, self-regulation can at best, even if it functions well, secure
partial protection. None of the provisions proposed is an effective access shield against
the government's retrieval expectations. It is therefore quite correct but still an under-
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process of consent is no more than a "mystification" that ignores the
long-standing experience that the value of a regulatory doctrine such as
"informed consent" depends entirely on the social and economic context
of the individual activity."29
An allocation of information that secures the necessary degree of
proliferation without invading privacy can only be achieved through a
mandatory framework for the processing of personal data. It should be
clear, however, that while such rules may provide convincing answers
to the specific questions arising out of the retrieval of personal informa-
tion, they will never respond satisfactorily to all the problems assem-
bled under the privacy rubric.1 30 Both the claim for and content of any
regulation are legitimated by the awareness of the implications of con-
stantly perfected information processing. The commitment to privacy
reflects specific experiences, concerns, and expectations. The more par-
ticular, therefore, the reaction to the peculiar aspects of intensified data
processing, the better the chances of successful regulatory intervention.
C. Data Processing-Basic Elements of a Regulation
Despite their different approaches to the problem, 31 statutes,
drafts, administrative procedures, court decisions, and reports of control
agencies now offer a solid basis for identifying at least four essentials of
an efficient processing regulation. First, the unique nature of the per-
sonal data processing must be recognized. Second, requests for personal
information must specify the purpose for which the data will be used,
thereby excluding all attempts at multifunctional processing. Third,
data protection regulations must be reviewed and updated constantly to
statement, to conclude that "the moment has been reached at which industry pleas of
laissez innover are not persuasive." Westin, supra note 93, at 112. For a discussion of
the regulatory principles, see 13 TB HDSB 53 (1984).
I" For an illustration of the difficulties and circumventing techniques in a typical
sector-medical treatment-see J. KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PA-
TIENT 48-84 (1984).
110 Although this idea may indeed appear to be a "reductionist" approach, see
Gavison, supra note 10, at 422, 460-67, it is the only way to replace meaningless
abstract commitments with precise and legally binding privacy policies.
131 For an overview of the development of data protection regulations, see F.
HONDIUS, EMERGING DATA PROTECTION IN EUROPE (1975); KOMMENTAR ZUM
BDSG, supra note 99, at 77 (discussing developments in West Germany, Sweden,
USA, and England); STUDY ON DATA SECURITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY, FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION AND DATA PROTECTION, DRAFT FINAL REPORT TO THE COMMIS-
SION FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS (1983);
Hondius, Data Law in Europe, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 87 (1980). The annual reports of
the West German Federal Data Protection Comissioner ("BFD") and the French Data
Protection Commission ("CNIL") also provide overviews of recent developments in
their respective countries. For a detailed bibliography on the subject, see D. FLAHERTY,
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION, AN INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY (1984).
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reflect changes in technology. Finally, there must be an independent
authority to enforce data regulations.
1. The Unique Nature of Personal Data Processing
The collection and retrieval of personal data must be viewed and
treated as an exceptional means to obtain information. Government as
well as private enterprises have, for far too long, considered the use of
personal data to be the norm. Instead of asking how to perform their
task without resorting to personal information, their interest has con-
centrated on developing new and better retrieval methods. Advances in
processing have become synonymous with easier and quicker access to a
steadily growing amount of data usable for more and more purposes.132
Consequently, where a "convenient" use of computers appears to be the
sole concern, purely technocratic considerations have held sway over all
others.
Hence, despite the importance of the content of rules governing the
collection and retrieval of personal data, the primary aim must be a
radical revision of the information methods. Yet, as the ongoing census
debate in West Germany shows,1"3 what in theory appears clearly nec-
essary is in practice not at all easy to accomplish.' 3 4 When, during the
proceedings in front of the West German Federal Constitutional
Court,"3 5 the Federal Statistical Office was asked whether the entire
population really had to provide such personal data, the Office replied
by reminding the judges of the Office's duty to keep all data secret and
pointing to the fact that the census had always been conducted in that
manner. It obviously never occurred to the Office that the increased
demand for and accelerated proliferation of personal data should induce
some thought about future comprehensive collections. The Court's reac-
182 See A. MILLER, supra note 124, at 20-23 (Increased access to automatically
processed data increases demand for such data.).
38 For a discussion of the background and main area of conflict, see 12 TB
HDSB 7 (1983) (discussing the present state of affairs following the German Constitu-
tional Court's invalidation of major sections of the National Census Statute).
134 For the experience in other countries, see CNIL, 2iME RAPPORT, supra note
30, at 21-22; D. FLAHERTY, supra note 82, at 39-47; T. Dalenius, Finding a Needle
in a Haystack, 2 J. OFFICIAL STATISTICS 329 (1986); F. Rapaport, Legal and Techni-
cal Means for Protecting Data in the Production of Statistics, 2 STATISTICAL J. U.N.
21 (1984).
For a review of the United States' experience in this area, see D. BURNHAM,
supra note 35, at 18-117; Burnham, Census Bureau Fighting Plan to Share its Per-
sonal Data, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1983, at Al, col. 1; White House Kills Plan to
Force Census Bureau to Share Data, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1983, at A16, col. 1.
185 On the constitutionality of the census law enacted in 1982 by the West Ger-
man Federal Parliament, BGBI.I 369 (1982), see Volkszuhlungsurteil, 65 BVerfGE 1,
55 (1983), discussed supra note 117.
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tion was brief and precise: statistical offices, like any other part of gov-
ernment, must constantly review their information methods in order to
minimize citizens' involvement." 6 Two years later, the West German
Federal Parliament, in an opinion accompanying the enactment of a
series of new statistic laws, explicitly advocated a change from coercive
to voluntary participation.1 37 Similarly, both the Council of Europe and
the European Science Foundation stressed the importance of dialogue
with the persons concerned, advocating the use of personal data only as
an auxiliary source of information and urged the development of new
research methods relying on anonymized or aggregated data." 8
None of these efforts ultimately can eliminate the processing of
personal information, which in a great number of situations in the pub-
lic as well as the private sector serves both the user and the individual
under scrutiny. Nevertheless, once priorities on information use are
clearly set, the burden of proof will be reversed. Whoever asks for per-
sonal data will be obliged to explain why and to what extent her par-
ticular purposes cannot be fullfilled by using other information. The
result should be a substantial reduction in the use of personal data. 3 9
In order to achieve this goal, however, more than a purely norma-
tive approach is needed. Technical resources also must be mobilized.
Instead of a simple focus on the convenience of the potential user, the
safeguarding of privacy must become an equally powerful consideration
in all further development of information technology.1 4Q Hardware and
software should, like motor vehicles or medicine, meet certain safety
is. Volkszihlungsurteil, 65 BVerfGE 1, 55-56 (1983).
137 BUNDESTAGS-DRUCKSACHE 10/3328, at 3 (May 14, 1985) (legislative mate-
rial on new West German national census statute passed in reaction to the invalidation
of the previous statute by the German Constitutional Court).
'38 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA USED FOR SCIEN-
TIFIC RESEARCH AND STATIsTIcs 2.1 to 2.2 (1984) (Recommendation No. R (83) 10,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Sept. 23, 1983)
(calling for respect of individual privacy and use of anonymous data in research projects
using personal data); European Science Foundation, Statement Concerning the Protec-
tion of Privacy and the Use of Personal Data for Research, § 1.5 (1980) (adopted by
the Assembly on the European Science Foundation on Nov. 12, 1980) ("[R]esearch
should, wherever possible, be undertaken with anonymised data."); see also Simitis,
Data Protection and Research: A Case Study of Control, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 583,
600-04 (1981) (discussing minimization of personal data use).
139 See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, supra note 35, at 513 (Even the
relatively modest specificity requirements of the U.S. Privacy Act "seem[] to have re-
sulted in a modest ... reduction in data collection itself.").
140 Even the most efficient technical means can, however, never replace normative
barriers. Whether, and under what circumstances, the collection as well as the retrieval
of certain data should be accepted is not a technical but a normative question. Only a
legally binding provision can therefore provide a satisfactory answer. For a discussion
of the relationship between normative and technical instruments in the history of data
protection, see Simitis, supra note 40, at 46.
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requirements before being put on the market. They should have a min-
imum of built-in protective devices. This requirement is by no means a
utopian expectation. Smart cards and videotex can, at least for payment
purposes, be designed in a way that demands almost no collection of
personal data.
2. The Clearly Specified Purpose of Processing Requests
Personal information should only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. Both government and private institutions should ab-
stain from collecting and retrieving data merely for possible future uses
for still unknown purposes. Both national 4" and international 142 or-
ganizations have in fact rejected the unlimited build-up of data files. In
order to be retrieved, data must be necessary to a precise goal that is
within the legally acknowledged activities of the organization interested
in the information. A normative barrier thus prevents the technically
possible multifunctional use of the data.
Yet, attempts to elude this restriction have never ceased because
most government branches and private enterprises still consider mul-
tifunctionality as the decisive advantage of automated processing. The
considerable amount of skill invested in exploiting loopholes in the
1974 United States Privacy Act provides a significant example."4 Pro-
visions reducing or even eliminating the otherwise mandatory standards
of justification in cases of "routine" use are a standing invitation to
circumvent the obligation to connect every processing with a clearly dis-
cernable purpose. Therefore, massive data transfers are legitimated
simply by qualifying them as purely routine "housekeeping" mea-
sures.14 4 Similarly, difficulties with regard to matching programs can
141 See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text (the example of the invalida-
tion of the West German census statute).
142 See Convention for the Protection of the Individual with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, opened for signature Jan. 28, 1981, art. 5(b), Europ.
T.S. No. 108 ("Personal data undergoing automatic processing shall be ... stored for
specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those pur-
poses ... ."), quoted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL WITH REGARD TO AUTO-
MATIC PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA 32 (1981); Guidelines on the Protections of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, adopted and applicable Sept. 23,
1980, art. 9 ("The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified
not later than at the time of data collection . . . ."), quoted in ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTIONS
OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA 10 (1981).
148 See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, supra note 35, at 515-16.
144 Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,953 (1975) (issued by United
States Office of Management and Budget).
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be avoided by pointing to their "routine" character.145
The limitation of purpose-bound processing not only affects the
actual handling of the data but also has far-reaching organizational
consequences. The purpose delineates both the internal and the exter-
nal use. Whether the user is an insider or an outsider, the specific aim
legitimating the collection restricts any further processing. Conse-
quently, government in particular no longer can be treated as a single
information unit, justifying a free flow of data among all governmental
units. An agency's specific functions and their relationship to the par-
ticular purpose that led to the collection of the data determine the ac-
cess to the information, not the mere fact that the agency is part of the
government. The internal structure of government, therefore, must be
reshaped to meet the demands of functional separation that inhibits
proliferation tendencies. 46
3. The Continual Review of Regulations
The regulation of personal data collection and retrieval should be
regarded as a constant learning process based on continual observation
of both the changes in information techniques and the conflicts gener-
ated by systematic data use. Most legislators adopt a different atti-
tude.14 7 They restrict themselves to a few extremely abstract provisions
that reflect both their hope of coping once and for all with the process-
ing problems and their complete uneasiness in dealing with a technol-
245 See Supplemental Guidance For Matching Programs, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,138,
23,141 (1979); see also UNITED STATES GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVACY ACT:
FEDERAL AGENCIES' IMPLEMENTATIONS CAN BE IMPROVED 31-36 (Report to the
Chairman, Subcomm. on Gov't Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, Aug. 1986, GAO/GGD-86-107) (discussing actual
matching practices of federal agencies); Kirchner, Privacy: A History of Computer
Matching in Federal Government, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 14, 1981, at 1, 2 (critical
analysis of excessive use of matching programs).
14' See, e.g., Volkszghlungsurteil, 65 BVerfGE 1, 68-69 (1983) (holding that gov-
ernmental agencies, especially on the county level, must be organized to guarantee that
data is used only for purpose for which it is collected); 10 TB HDSB 66-68 (1981)
(For purposes of data use, a municipality cannot be considered a single unit: data pro-
tection provisions must apply when one municipal office transfers data to another of-
fice.). The concept of a "functional separation" was first developed in connection with
the processing of personal data for research purposes. The inaccessibility of the data
was and is seen as the primary condition for establishing a regulation allowing process-
ing based on the particular research needs. See COUNCIL OF EuROPE, supra note 138,
at 4.1; PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, supra note 35, at 572-74; European
Science Foundation, supra note 138, at §2.5 ("Personal Data obtained for research
should not be used for any purpose other than research."); Simitis, supra note 138, at
597.
147 For an analysis of the various legislative concepts, see KOMMENTAR ZUM
BDSG, supra note 99, at 77.
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ogy the further developments of which are as difficult to foresee as their
exact implications.
None of the early laws, therefore, reacted effectively to the evolu-
tion of information procedures. 4" Contrary, for instance, to early as-
sumptions, the structure of processing has not been determined by the
establishment of huge data banks nor has access to information systems
proven to be a privilege reserved to an elite of specialists. 149 Further-
more, the conditions justifying a retrieval can only be defined by care-
fully considering the particular characteristics of the area in which the
data are to be used. For example, a retrieval for social security pur-
poses should be premised on a careful analysis of the welfare system
involved. The same applies to electronic banking. Whether the solu-
tions to the problems in this area really work depends on the ability to
integrate the conflict structures characteristic of the credit sector into
the applicable regulatory scheme.
1 5 0
Efficient protection thus begins when the quest for abstract, gener-
ally applicable provisions is abandoned. The emphasis must shift to a
context-bound allocation of information embodied in a complex system
of both specific and substantive regulations.1 51 Yet, no matter how pre-
cise the rules, they nevertheless remain provisional measures because of
the incessant advances in technology. Regulations on the collection and
retrieval of personal data thus present a classic case of sunset legisla-
tion."' If the legislator wants to master processing issues, she must
commit herself explicitly to a constant reappraisal of the various rules.
4. An Independent Data Control Authority
Efficient regulation presupposes the establishment of an indepen-
dent control authority. Experience confirms what was argued in the
earliest debates: a mandatory framework for data processing is not suf-
148 See Simitis, General Report, in BEYOND 1984, supra note 27, at 109, 113-14.
See Soma & Wehmhoefer, A Legal and Technical Assessment of the Effect of
Computers on Privacy, 60 DEN. L.J. 449, 450-54 (1983) (describing growth and avail-
ability of relatively inexpensive computers).
150 See id. at 463-65 (discussing the balancing of interests embodied in the Fair
Credit Reporting Act).
"' This is a tendency which is becoming more and more obvious, particularly in
connection with the processing of personal data for social security, police, or videotex
purposes. See RodotA, supra note 11, at 222, 234 (recommending flexible instead of
strict rules); Simitis, supra note 40, at 44.
"' For example, art. 31 of the 1985 Icelandic Law on the Systematic Recording
of Personal Data explicitly requires that the existing provisions be replaced by a new
regulation by December 31, 1989. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COMMTTriEE OF EXPERTS
ON DATA PROTECTION, REPORT OF ICELANDIC ACT No. 39/1955 ON SYSTEMATIC
RECORDING OF PERSONAL DATA (1986).
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ficient.15 '3 The legislator must also provide a control to monitor collec-
tion and retrieval conditions. Neither intervention by the data subject
nor any of the traditional control mechanisms guarantees adequate su-
pervision. Even if the persons concerned are entrusted with control
rights, they remain, as a rule, outsiders, deprived of the knowledge nec-
essary to understand and evaluate the activities of the various govern-
ment agencies and private institutions. The obvious conflict of interest
discredits all attempts to reduce the supervision to purely internal pro-
cedures. Finally, both the technical knowledge essential for effective
monitoring and the necessary intensity of the supervision exclude su-
pervision by any of the other existing control authorities. 15"
Despite the growing readiness to combine substantive regulatory
provisions on information processing with the establishment of a partic-
ular control institution, the difficulties in implementing efficient moni-
toring are still considerable. Although it is undisputed that the control
authority must be clearly separated from all the potential data users,
this "independence" of the control authority, generally considered the
crucial element of true supervision, remains hard to define. Certainly,
an equidistance from both the public and the private sector constitutes
the first and foremost condition of independent supervision. It is pre-
cisely for this reason that the Hessian Data Protection Act links the
control authority to the Hessian Parliament.155
The West German solution-the establishment of a Data Protec-
tion Commissioner-indicates the insufficiency of traditional monitor-
ing mechanisms in highly industrialized societies marked by rapid ad-
vances in information technology. The existence of a separate control
authority reflects, to a large extent, Parliament's difficulties in exercis-
ing its own control tasks in an area vital to the structure and develop-
ment of society. In other words, because Parliament cannot by itself
adequately oversee the consequences of automated processing, a
paraparliamentary institution takes over a genuine parliamentary
activity.
The integration into the parliamentary organization also underlies
the essential difference between the Data Protection Commissioner and
153 See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, POLICY ISSUES IN DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY 13-19, 56-103 (1976)
(Proceedings of the OECD Seminar, June 24-26, 1974); PRIVACY PROTECTION
STUDY COMM'N, supra note 35, at 34-35; U. DAMMANN, DIE KoNTROLLE DES
DATENSCHUTZES 11-13 (1977).
'" The question whether the control tasks could be assigned to one of the existing
control authorities is discussed extensively in U. DAMMANN, supra note 153, at 101-
114, 131-185.
155 3d Hessian Data Protection Act, §§ 21-31; Simitis, supra note 120, at 128-29.
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nearly every other state agency created during the last decades. Its task
consists not of helping government enforce its policies but of preventing
both government and private institutions from overstepping the bound-
aries guaranteeing the democratic structure of society. Therefore, the
possibility of conflict with state agencies and private enterprises is ever
present. The potential for a clash, especially with the government, has
induced some legislatures to entrust the control task to a commission. 56
All conflicts over the collection and retrieval of personal data are han-
dled by a group of carefully selected persons representing the major
political and societal interests. The need for continuously renewed com-
promise thus governs control activities. In addition, commissions includ-
ing representatives of government branches and of private organizations
processing personal data tend to internalize all controversies and there-
fore to inhibit genuine public debate or at least to reduce substantially
its topics. Hence, the control authority runs the risk of becoming an
agency that legitimates processing practices and new information-gath-
ering methods, rather than an agency that monitors and, if necessary,
openly condemns them.
Another no less noteworthy obstacle to true supervision results
from the often sharply restricted jurisdiction of the control authorities.
West German law, for instance, prescribes independent commissioners
only for the public sector.1 57 Private institutions are also monitored, but
by agencies fully integrated into government.1 58 Unlike the commission-
ers, none of these agencies is under the obligation to report its activities
158 See, e.g. Loi relative a l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libert~s, Loi No. 78-
17 of 6 January 1978, arts. 6-13, 1978 J.O. 227, 1978 B.L.D. 77 (French data protec-
tion law); Lov. nr. 48 om personen registre (Personal Data Registers Act), June 9,
1978, § 2 (Nor.), NORGER LOVER 1685-1985, at 2180 (Oslo 1986) [hereinafter Nor-
wegian personal data registers law], reprinted in 5 Computer Law Serv. (Callaghan)
app. 9-5.2a, no. 5 (1979); Landesgesetz zum Schutze des BUrgers bei der Verarbeitung
personenbezogener Daten, Dec. 21, 1978, §§ 17-22, Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt ffir
das Land Rheinland-Pfalz 749 (1978) (West German state of Rheinland-Pfalz data
protection act); Swiss draft data protection law, supra note 100, at arts. 44-56; see also
CNIL, BILAN Er PERsPEcTivEs, supra note 32, at 15-23 (1980) and CNIL, 2ME
RAPPORT, supra note 30, at 9-11 (1982) (discussing the nature, mission, and organiza-
tion of the CNIL); Selmer, Norwegian Privacy Legislation, in J. BING & K. SELMER,
A DECADE OF COMPUTERS AND LAw 45 (1980) (discussing the Norwegian Data In-
spectorate, established by the Personal Data Registers Act as a monitoring body).
157 See, e.g. BDSG §§ 17-21; Bayerisches Gesetz zum Schutz vor Missbrauch
personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbeitung (Bayerisches Datenschutzgesetz),
Apr. 28, 1978, §§ 27-28, Bayerisches Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt 165 (1978) (West
German state of Bavaria data protection act); 3d Hessian Data Protection Act §§ 3,
24(1); see also KOMMENTAR ZUM BDSG, supra note 99, at 590 (discussing commis-
sioners' rights and control difficulties).
1" See BDSG §§ 30, 40; KOMMENTAR ZUM BDSG, supra note 99, at 917, 1089
(discussing the role of the state agencies controlling the application of the data protec-
tion rules in the private sector).
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regularly and in public. The consequence is an increasingly one-dimen-
sional discussion of processing problems. Because the practices of pri-
vate institutions remain largely unknown, government appears to be the
only source of practices necessitating regulatory intervention.159
There are also striking differences in the rights granted to the con-
trol authorities. Both the Norwegian'"0 and the Austrian161 data pro-
tection laws, for example, provide the data protection agencies with ex-
ecutive powers. Conflicts with the demands of the processing
regulations are thus solved directly. Conversely, the West German law
relies on the impact of public discussion. The commissioners must, of
course, receive all the necessary information 62 and almost certainly
will demand the immediate correction of collection or retrieval practices
violating the data protection acts. 6 If their action is ignored, however,
they can do no more than immediately inform parliament and the gen-
eral public.
In this situation, the threat of public controversy replaces coercive
intervention. At first this result seems to be a rather surprising choice;
but, where, as in the case of the Hessian Commissioner, the control
authority is fully integrated into the parliamentary organization, the
denial of executive powers is the price for the close connection between
Parliament and the supervision of the processing activities.'" Neither
Parliament nor any of its subordinate parts can directly interfere with
the Executive and impose administrative measures.
There are other, far more general, reasons for the deliberate re-
straint of the commissioners' powers. The reverse of executive rights is
judicial control. 65 Where, as with data protection, the success of the
regulation depends on an open system of rules, constantly adapted to
the increasing knowledge of processing practices and changing informa-
tion techniques, recourse to judicial intervention in the conflicts may
quickly reduce the flexibility of the law and thereby inhibit the guiding
'50 For a detailed discussion, see 10 TB HDSB 7, 18 (1981).
L60 See Norwegian personal data registers law, supra note 156, §§ 3, 8.
161 See Bundesgesetz iber den Schutz personenbezogener Daten (Daten-
schutzgesetz), Oct. 18, 1978, §§ 36, 37, Bundesgesetzblatt ffir die Republik Osterreich
565 (1978), as last amended id. at 370 (1986) [hereinafter Austrian data protection
law]; see M. MATZKA, DATENSCHUTZRECHT FOR DIE PRAXIS §§ 36, 37 (1986).
162 See, e.g., BDSG, § 19(3); 3d Hessian Data Protection Act, § 29; KoM-
MENTAR ZUM BDSG, supra note 99, at 589.
163 See, e.g., 7 TB BFD 17, 32, 41, 71, 74 (1985); 13 TB HDSB 21, 27, 45
(1984).
1" See Simitis, supra note 120, at 131.
165 This is an implication explicitly mentioned by art. 56 of the Swiss draft data
protection act, supra note 100; see also art. 36 para. 4 of the Austrian data protection
law, supra note 161 (foreseeing an appeal to the Austrian Verwaltungsgerichtshof (ad-
ministrative court)).
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effect of the legal requirements.
As efficient a corrective instrument as public controversy may be
in certain situations, an appeal to the general public loses its potency if
used too often. Consequently, the lack of executive powers, especially
for the control of the private sector, has been increasingly criticized. 6
The more the monitoring of processing practices loses its exceptional
character, the less convincing it becomes not to allow direct protection
by the control authority. Procedures reflecting hesitations inherent in a
new regulation dealing with still unknown implications of collection
and processing must give way to better formulations once the conflicts
grow familiar and experience is gained in dealing with them. Both the
credibility and efficiency of control depend largely on the ability to se-
cure a strict as well as a quick adaptation of processing practices to the
expectations of the law.
CONCLUSION
The processing of personal data is not unique to a particular soci-
ety. On the contrary, the attractiveness of information technology tran-
scends political boundaries, particularly because of the opportunity to
guide the individual's behavior. For a democratic society, however, the
risks are high: labeling of individuals, manipulative tendencies, magni-
fication of errors, and strengthening of social control threaten the very
fabric of democracy. Yet, despite the incontestable importance of its
technical aspects, informatization, like industrialization, is primarily a
political and social challenge. When the relationship between informa-
tion processing and democracy is understood, it becomes clear that the
protection of privacy is the price necessary to secure the individual's
ability to communicate and participate. Regulations that create pre-
cisely specified conditions for personal data processing are the decisive
test for discerning whether society is aware of this price and willing to
pay it. If the signs of experience are correct, this payment can be
delayed no further. There is, in fact, no alternative to the advice of
Horace: Seize the day, put not trust in the morrow.6"
166 See 10 TB HDSB 29 (1981); KOMMENTAR ZUM BDSG, supra note 99, at
920.
187 "Carpe diem quam minimum credula postero." HORACE, ODES, 1.11.
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